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Nonobviousness: Before and After
Dmitry Karshtedt*
ABSTRACT: The requirement of nonobviousness, codified in 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, has been called “the ultimate condition of patentability” because of its
crucial function of keeping technically trivial inventions out of the patent
system. The obviousness determination must be made based on the state of the
invention’s field at a particular point in time—in the Patent Act’s current
version, the date that the patent application was effectively filed with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
However, in spite of the critical role of time in patent law and the danger that
hindsight bias could distort § 103 analysis when patentability is evaluated
long after the relevant date (as it usually is), the seminal Supreme Court
obviousness opinion in Graham v. John Deere said little about temporal
considerations. Instead, Graham’s lasting contribution was to suggest that
the § 103 inquiry is to be divided into two stages based on the source of the
proffered evidence. The Court said that as an initial matter, the PTO or a
court should look to pre-patent publications and other materials in the public

*

Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. I would like to
thank Michael Baldwin, Benjamin DuBois, Kayvon Ghayoumi, Matthew Pelcowitz, and Qi Yu for
excellent research assistance and readers of prior drafts and commenters on presentations of this
Article for helpful feedback. In particular, I thank Michael Abramowicz, Jonas Anderson,
Stephanie Bair, Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Jeremy Bock, Melissa Brand, Daniel Brean, Sarah Burstein,
Burlette Carter, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Kevin Collins, Christopher Cotropia, Thomas
Cotter, Jonathan Darrow, Gregory Dolin, Charles Duan, John Duffy, Tabrez Ebrahim, Rachel
Elsby, Janet Freilich, Michael Furrow, Charles Garris, Shubha Ghosh, Hank Greely, Paul
Gugliuzza, Timothy Holbrook, Camilla Hrdy, Cathy Hwang, Daniel Kazhdan, Scott Kieff, Daniel
Klein, Amy Landers, Peter Lee, Mark Lemley, Michael Madison, Gregory Mandel, Andrew
Michaels, Lidiya Mishchenko, Alan Morrison, Christopher Morten, Amy Motomura, Lucas
Osborn, Kristen Osenga, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Nicholson Price, Jason
Rantanen, Greg Reilly, Jason Reinecke, Alix Rogers, Douglas Rogers, Catherine Ross, Rachel
Sachs, Joshua Sarnoff, David Schwartz, Sean Seymore, Jacob Sherkow, Michal Shur-Ofry, Ted
Sichelman, Norman Siebrasse, David Simon, Matthew Sipe, Kate Weisburd, and Kip Werking for
feedback on prior drafts; and participants in the 2020 SEALS Conference, Patent Scholars
Roundtable V, The George Washington Law School Wednesday Lunch Series, UM/UB Junior
Faculty Workshop, Fifth Annual Texas A&M Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable, Eighth
Annual Mid-Atlantic Patent Works-in-Progress, 19th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference, Junior IP Scholars Association Workshops at GW, William & Mary, and
Northwestern, Stanford Center for Law and the Biosciences Workshop Series, Changing
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Conference at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law, and Ninth Annual Patent Conference for presentation comments.

1609

This preprint research paper has
Electronic
not been
copy
peer
available
reviewed.
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851

A1_KARSHTEDT (DO NOT DELETE)

1610

5/23/2021 2:31 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1609

domain and determine the differences between those disclosures and the patent
claim at issue. Further, should the parties introduce additional evidence that
the Court called “secondary considerations,” such as commercial success of
the patented product or failure of others to come up with the claimed
invention, decision-makers would need to continue the analysis to determine
the relevance and weight of this evidence before making a final judgment on
validity. Although courts and commentators disagree vigorously about the
relative roles of these two aspects of the nonobviousness calculus, the primarysecondary framework has a central place in the law of § 103.
This Article shows that Graham’s apparent creation of two tiers of
obviousness evidence has caused confusion and error, and should be rejected
in favor of a different approach that is focused on time. First, the rigid
segmenting of the patentability inquiry into two steps, which is seen in some
lower-court decisions interpreting Graham, has caused certain evidence to be
arbitrarily discounted or bolstered depending on whether it falls into the
primary or secondary silo. Second, and more pernicious, these evidentiary tiers
have obscured the significance of time for patentability. This Article argues
that, instead, the filing date of the patent application as the default dividing
line between the pre- and post-invention state of the relevant field provides a
more logical fulcrum around which to organize the § 103 analysis.
Accordingly, obviousness evidence should be classified based on whether it
came into existence independently of the patent and generally prior to filing
(ex ante) or, instead, whether it appeared in response to the invention or during
its further, post-filing, development (ex post). This Article demonstrates that the
proposed scheme would pave the way to a more rational approach to § 103 by
helping decision-makers determine the relevance and weight of various
obviousness evidence with greater accuracy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The requirement of nonobviousness, codified in the Patent Act in 35
U.S.C. § 103, has been called “the ultimate condition of patentability”1
because it serves the key function of weeding out patents on technically trivial
inventions2 and is contested in a large majority of patent cases.3 Decision1. See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980); see also Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1593 (2011) (collecting references); John R. Thomas, Formalism
at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 789 (2003) (identifying nonobviousness as “[t]he
fundamental gatekeeper to patenting”).
2. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 512–13 (7th ed. 2017).
3. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (2008) (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence
on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 209 tbl.2 (1998)); see also Apple Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“Obviousness is

This preprint research paper has
Electronic
not been
copy
peer
available
reviewed.
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851

A1_KARSHTEDT (DO NOT DELETE)

1612

5/23/2021 2:31 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1609

makers have struggled to devise a framework for determining if a patent claim
would have been obvious,4 and the challenge of § 103 can be highlighted in
comparison to its U.S. Code neighbor, § 102.5 The requirement of novelty in
§ 102 is addressed to a relatively tractable, rule-like question of whether a
single piece of “prior art”—such as a previous patent or a journal
publication—identically discloses all the elements of the invention to which
the would-be patentee is attempting to claim a right.6 In contrast,
nonobviousness is a relatively amorphous standard that bars patents on
inventions that have not improved enough upon the prior art.7
Indeed, the statute is not very informative on what it takes for a patent
claim to be adjudged nonobvious. Section 103 states that obviousness is
decided based on whether “the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious,”8 thus committing the cardinal sin of using the term to be
defined in its own definition. Moreover, this language does not answer the
difficult question of how significant the differences between the prior art and
the claim must be in order to pass § 103.9 Given the meager guidance in the
Patent Act and the fact that the origins of obviousness are non-statutory, the

the most common invalidity issue in both district court and post-grant proceedings before the
PTO.”).
4. See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness
Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 61 (2008) [hereinafter Mandel,
Excessive Patent Grants].
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
6. See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic
Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1433 n.249 (2013) (“In order for [a claim] to fail the § 102 test,
the prior art has to disclose the exact same invention.” (citing Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v.
Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). An alternative to the strict novelty principle is
“substantial novelty,” sometimes also described as “substantial identity”—a concept that overlaps
in some aspects with the modern nonobviousness requirement. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note
2, at 401 (discussing the relationship between substantial novelty and nonobviousness). See
generally N. Scott Pierce, Common Sense: Treating Statutory Non-Obviousness as a Novelty Issue, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 539 (2012) (arguing that nonobviousness is best
analyzed as substantial novelty).
7. Sean B. Seymore, Reinvention, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 1064 (2017) (“Nonobviousness
is a standard.”); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 643 (discussing some challenges in
applying the nonobviousness standard).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
9. Mandel, Excessive Patent Grants, supra note 4, at 8889 (identifying this feature of the
statute as one of three factors leading to indeterminacy). See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, A CostBenefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39 (2008) (making this observation
about the statute and the case law); John F. Duffy, A Timing Approach to Patentability, 12 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 343 (2008) [hereinafter Duffy, Timing Approach] (arguing that a “timing
approach” can achieve greater clarity for determining what would have been obvious); Joseph
Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Miller, Looking Back] (reviewing development of the nonobviousness standard in
view of the limited statutory guidance).
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framework for applying this requirement of patentability has naturally been
built up and refined mostly through case law development.10 Courts, however,
have not done much better, instead complicating the inquiry without a clear
payoff.
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s seminal 1966 opinion in Graham v. John
Deere has led to a dubious segmentation of the obviousness inquiry into two
stages, during which two different kinds of evidence are respectively
analyzed.11 The first stage incorporates the factors captured by the statutory
language, and thus calls on a tribunal to examine disclosures in the prior art
references, the differences between them and the patent claim at issue, and
the level of ordinary skill in the relevant field.12 The second stage—which
covers evidence that the Supreme Court actually termed “secondary
considerations,”13 but other courts have sometimes described as “objective
indicia”14—involves looking at real-world facts such as commercial success of
the patented product and failure of others to come up with the claimed
invention.15 Given all this information, the tribunal is ultimately supposed to
determine if the invention would have been obvious to a hypothetical “person
having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA”) as of the date that the patent
application was filed.16 But courts have offered little guidance on how to
integrate these two types of evidence into the ultimate § 103 determination.
The Apple v. Samsung litigation over patents covering smartphone
features illustrates the doctrinal difficulties created by Graham.17 One of the
patents asserted by Apple covered the familiar “slide to unlock” tool.18
Samsung’s key prior art against the patent was a mobile phone with a touchsensitive screen that could be unlocked by the sweep of a finger.19 But the
screen lacked an “unlock image” (e.g., a touch-sensitive arrow) claimed by

10. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2052 (2007) (“[T]he issue’s status as a
question of law, as well as the spare statutory language, means that the law of obviousness is
entirely a creation of the courts.”).
11. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1718.
14. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
15. Graham, 383 U.S. at 1718.
16. See WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1334. PHOSITA is a term of art in patent law that refers to a
hypothetical construct, sometimes likened to the reasonable person of negligence law, from
whose perspective obviousness is evaluated. See Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of
Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 227–28 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885,
885–86 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom]; Greg Reilly, Rethinking the PHOSITA in
Patent Litigation, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 501, 501 (2016).
17. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1047–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc).
18. Id. at 1049–50.
19. Id. at 1050.
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Apple, which foreclosed an argument for lack of novelty under § 102.20 The
second reference described a wall-mounted air conditioning unit that could
be powered on by, among other methods, toggling a graphical “slider” on a
touchscreen between the “off” and “on” positions.21 The two pieces of prior
art together disclosed all the elements of the slide-to-unlock claim that
Samsung was accused of infringing.22 But would it have been obvious for a
PHOSITA to combine them to achieve this invention at the relevant time?23
Apple argued that the use of the unlock tool in a mobile phone
embodied a creative insight worthy of a patent under § 103.24 Apple’s experts
explained that a PHOSITA would not have thought to modify the prior art
phone with a slider because the toggle switch was not popular with users and
that, in any event, technology from wall-mounted devices cannot be readily
adapted to smartphones.25 Apple also introduced several pieces of secondary
considerations evidence: namely, that the invention solved the longstanding
problem of pocket dialing, was copied by Samsung, and helped drive the
iPhone’s commercial success.26 Samsung, in contrast, contended that the
slide-to-unlock claim was so close to the prior art that it would have been
obvious as a matter of law.27
A jury found that the claim was not invalid and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals,
ultimately upheld that verdict in an en banc decision.28 Apple concluded that
[t]hough the prior art references each relate to touchscreens, the
totality of the evidence supports the conclusion that it would not
have been obvious for a skilled artisan, seeking an unlock
mechanism that would be both intuitive to use and solve the pocket
dialing problem for cell phones, to look to a wall-mounted
controller for an air conditioner.29

20. Id.
21. Id. at 1051.
22. Id. at 1049–51.
23. Here, the apparent date for measuring validity was the so-called “priority date” of the
application that matured into the slide-to-unlock patent, which was December 23, 2005. See U.S.
Patent No. 8,046,721, at [63].
24. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1051.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 105257.
27. Id. at 1050–51. Invalidating an asserted claim is a way for a defendant in a patent case
to avoid liability for infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2018).
28. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1039–40, 1058. In doing so, the full court reversed a panel decision
that had essentially reached contrary conclusions on every factual issue underlying the
obviousness determination, as well as on the overall role of secondary considerations in the § 103
inquiry. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 816 F.3d 788 (Fed. Cir.), vacated in part on reh’g en banc,
839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
29. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1058.
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The court then proceeded to address secondary considerations. It noted
that “the objective indicia found by the jury . . . are particularly strong in this
case and powerfully weigh in favor of validity”30 and added that “[t]hese real
world indicators of whether the combination would have been obvious to the
skilled artisan in this case ‘tip the scales of patentability.’”31 Thus, like the
other evidence addressed in Apple, objective indicia favored nonobviousness.
But what if the two kinds of evidence pointed in opposite directions? How do
we know when secondary considerations are strong enough relative to the
other evidence to tip the scales toward patentability?32 The Federal Circuit
said little on this score,33 and generally provided scant guidance on the role
of objective indicia other than to say that they must be considered if a party
proffers them.34
Apple exemplifies some of the problems created by Graham: Courts have
not been clear on the framework for determining obviousness and the
function of secondary considerations within it. For example, some opinions
relegate objective indicia to rebuttal evidence,35 while others treat them as an
integral part of the § 103 inquiry.36 These inconsistencies raise the
unwelcome specter of arbitrary decision-making.37 Even more pernicious, and
central to this Article’s thesis, is the problem that the very distinction between
the two types of evidence is not particularly coherent given the scheme for
evaluating obviousness that courts have developed after Graham. This Article’s
goal is to show that a different approach to classifying § 103 evidence would
help resolve the tensions in the case law and better effectuate the goals of this
requirement.
Indeed, a mechanism for screening out patents on technically trivial
inventions is essential to a well-functioning patent system—and
nonobviousness plays that critical role.38 First, inventions that embody
insignificant variations on what is known are likely to be created without the
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)).
32. Those were the very issues at play in the panel opinion that the full court ultimately
vacated and reversed. See Apple, 816 F.3d at 804 (“Here, the prima facie case of obviousness was
strong. Apple’s evidence of secondary considerations was weak and did not support a conclusion
that the . . . patent was nonobvious.”).
33. The court offered only the cryptic statement that “[t]o the extent that [an earlier
opinion] should be interpreted as precluding a jury finding of long-felt need favoring nonobviousness when the difference between the prior art and the claimed invention is small, we
reject such a categorical rule.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1056 (citing Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys.
Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
34. Id. at 1048.
35. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
36. See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
37. See infra Part III; see also Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. 874 F.3d 724,
731–34 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Newman, J., dissenting) (detailing the inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit’s
case law on this point).
38. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 643.
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incentive of a patent.39 In these circumstances, “denying a patent on the
innovation costs society nothing (because the innovation would be developed
anyway) and saves society from needlessly suffering the well-known negative
consequences of patents.”40 Second, rewarding routine innovation with
patents may channel resources toward the low-hanging fruit and away from
higher-value projects, slowing technological progress.41 Third, a lax or nonexistent nonobviousness requirement can contribute to the growth of socalled “patent thickets,” resulting in high search costs for various participants
in the economy who may be affected by patents.42
While these economic considerations amply justify § 103, it can be
difficult to figure out directly if an invention would have been made, or at
least made nearly as quickly,43 without the inducement of a patent.
Furthermore, the PTO and courts probably do not have the institutional
capacities to measure if a particular patent grant would lead to unjustifiable
“deadweight losses” (i.e., higher prices commanded by patented products)
and other economic inefficiencies.44 Instead, the modern approach to
obviousness relies largely on the difficulty of the cognitive and technical tasks
of coming up with the claimed invention as a proxy for screening out patents
of questionable social value.45 Under this framework, patentability is
determined based on whether the subject matter would have been risky for a
PHOSITA to pursue and challenging to discover at the time of patent

39. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1594.
40. Id.
41. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 516 (“[G]ranting patents to obvious developments may
compromise the incentives that the patent system provides to develop nonobvious inventions.”).
42. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1,
12 (2007) [hereinafter Duffy, Inventing Invention]; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 516–17.
43. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1626–27; Chiang, supra note 9, at 41–42.
44. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 276–77 (2007) (“Instead of asking whether a
given patent is necessary to promote innovation, the patent statute directs the PTO to determine
whether the patent application meets validity standards that have scientific and technical
underpinnings.”); see also id. at 278 (“Scientifically- and technically-based requirements such as
nonobviousness can . . . serve as reasonably good proxies for the ultimate economic inquiry.”).
But cf. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1655–77 (making the contrary argument that these
adjudicators can and should perform the requisite economic analysis). To be clear, an approach
to obviousness that is more focused on economic rather than cognitive challenges of pursuing
the claimed invention can still benefit from this Article’s proposal, except that the focus of the
evidence would be on an ex ante economic risk rather than a technical or cognitive one.
45. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1487
–92 (2010) (discussing the cognitive aspect of obviousness determinations); Amy L. Landers,
Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the Scientist, 75 MO. L. REV. 1, 69–75 (2010)
(examining mental processes that reflect ordinary creativity for the purposes of obviousness
analysis); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
813, 830–32 [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of Innovation] (discussing the risk dimension
of the nonobviousness requirement).
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application filing.46 Although, as Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy have
shown, this approach reflects some built-in economic considerations, the
focus of the current doctrine is mainly on the technical challenge of getting
to the claimed invention.47
Superimposed upon the primary-secondary distinction, the test for
implementing the cognitive framework asks whether a PHOSITA would have
been motivated to “modify” or “combine” the prior art to arrive at the
invention,48 and would have had a reasonable expectation of success of doing
so, at the time of filing.49 This test was developed by the Federal Circuit and
arguably endorsed by the Supreme Court in KSR International v. Teleflex,50 a
key post-Graham § 103 decision. Nevertheless, subsequent cases have not fully
reconciled KSR and Graham. For example, it has not been clearly recognized
that KSR implicitly undermined Graham by emphasizing the value of evidence
not in the prior art and exhorting lower courts to pay heed to timing in the
§ 103 analysis.51 Moreover, as the Apple case illustrates, evidence like
commercial success and failure of others fits uneasily within the motivationexpectation inquiry.52
This Article builds on the work of scholars who have made foundational
observations that secondary considerations are generally something of a
puzzle. For example, several commentators have critiqued the relevance of
some of this evidence53 and the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent treatment of
it.54 This Article adds to these contributions by making a more sweeping point

46. See infra Section II.C.
47. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1608–12; see also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan
Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 84 (2020) (noting the complexities
in the cognitive approach to obviousness).
48. I use quotation marks because the inventor usually does not actually modify the prior
art—rather, the question is whether the “omniscient” PHOSITA would be able to do so readily. See,
e.g., In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
49. See infra Section II.C. Sometimes, these elements are phrased somewhat differently,
depending on the nature of the specific problem addressed by the invention. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La
Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 748 F.3d 1326, 1329, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[t]he issue
in this case is whether it would have been obvious at the time of invention to select” the claimed
invention’s parameters and later going on to discuss “a reasonable expectation of success”).
50. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 408, 410–11, 414 (2007).
51. See infra Section III.C.2.
52. See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text.
53. Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT.
REV. 293, 315–20 [hereinafter Kitch, New Standards for Patents]; Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 859 (1988)
[hereinafter Merges, Commercial Success] (contending that “commercial success is a poor indicator
of significant technical advance” in many circumstances).
54. Jonathan J. Darrow, Secondary Considerations: A Structured Framework for Patent Analysis, 74
ALB. L. REV. 47, 50–53 (2011) [hereinafter Darrow, Secondary Considerations]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375, 383, 418 (2008) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Nonobvious Problem] (noting that the Federal Circuit on the one hand “has fortified
the relevance of” objective indicia, but on the other that “[t]he coding of [certain] evidence as
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about secondary considerations and their role within the cognitive
framework. It argues that Graham’s very scheme is problematic and outdated
and should be abandoned. Confusion and error have set in because the
primary-secondary distinction obscures the significance of time that KSR
sought to reinforce. This Article then argues that the Graham heuristic should
be more explicitly displaced by a framework that better accounts for the
crucial role of the time of filing.55
In short, this Article contends that obviousness evidence has been
characterized based on the wrong feature. It shows that the logically salient
dividing line is not between primary and secondary factors, but rather
between evidence coming into existence independently of the invention and
usually prior to the filing date of the patent application (ex ante) and
evidence that appears in response to the invention or during its further, postfiling, development (ex post).56 Although courts and commentators have
addressed the significance of timing for obviousness—in the context of socalled “hindsight bias,”57 and beyond58—the distinction between ex ante and
ex post evidence has not yet been articulated in a comprehensive way. This
Article fills this gap and maintains that the proposed approach would facilitate
the tasks of ascertaining the relevance and weight of various pieces of
obviousness evidence and thus lead to a more coherent and accurate
patentability analysis.
The filing date provides a natural scheme for organizing the evidence in
§ 103 cases because ex ante and ex post factors are relevant to the motivation
and reasonable expectation elements in analytically distinct ways. Ex ante
evidence bears directly on the state of the art at the time of filing and, thus, on
a PHOSITA’s challenge in bridging the differences between the prior art and

‘secondary’ may have led the Federal Circuit to discount its relevance in” an important decision).
See generally Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9 (proposing an approach to weighing secondary
considerations based on timing); Durie & Lemley, supra note 3 (arguing that courts should focus
on secondary considerations evidence that is realistically available to a PHOSITA).
55. See infra Part IV; see also infra Table 2 (tabulating the proposed changes).
56. While this Article uses the phrase “filing date” for simplicity, a technically more accurate
term is “priority” date, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2018), which refers to the “effective filing date” of
a patent application, see id. § 100(i). For the differences in the law before and after the Leahy–Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), with respect to the relevant
dates against which novelty and nonobviousness are measured, see infra notes 357–58 and
accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (discussing hindsight
bias); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1400–03 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel,
Hindsight Bias] (providing empirical evidence of hindsight bias in the adjudication of patent
cases). For more discussion of hindsight bias, see infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 937 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (noting the importance of analyzing certain § 103 evidence based on the time of filing).
See generally Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9 (addressing the significance of the length of time
that a piece of evidence was available for nonobviousness determinations).
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the invention.59 In contrast, ex post evidence requires a more attenuated
chain of inferences and accordingly bears indirectly on these issues.60 Although
this feature does not make it consistently less probative than ex ante evidence,
the indirect nature of ex post evidence does create the additional burden of
connecting it to the time of filing. This insight extends the concept of “nexus,”
which courts currently rely on mainly to test if the proffered objective indicia
relate to the technical merit of the claimed invention,61 to timing
considerations.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth the doctrinal
foundations of obviousness, discusses and critiques the Graham opinion, and
chronicles Graham’s aftermath—which includes the emergence of the
cognitive approach and an increasing recognition of the significance of time
in the § 103 inquiry. Part III lays out the Article’s first contribution, detailing
the shortcomings of the primary-secondary framework and arguing that
courts should no longer rely on it. Part IV describes the Article’s second
contribution, demonstrating how and why § 103 decision-making would be
improved by focusing on the distinction between ex ante and ex post
evidence. The Article then concludes in Part V.
II. NONOBVIOUSNESS: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A. LIFE BEFORE GRAHAM: “INVENTION” AND CODIFICATION
The core statutory patentability requirements dating back to the earliest
versions of the Patent Act are novelty and utility.62 Novelty, now codified in
§ 102, mandates that all the elements of the patent claim under review not be
identically disclosed in a single prior art reference, and utility, in § 101,
requires patented inventions to be useful—both relatively low bars.63
Nonetheless, the history of U.S. patent law reflects a pervasive sense that these
prerequisites are not sufficient for a well-functioning patent system.64 If one
believes that patents on technically trivial advances should be prohibited, then
novelty and utility are inadequate65 because a trivial invention can undoubtedly
59. But cf. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 863 (contending that some types of
pre-filing evidence constitute indirect evidence of nonobviousness from the technical perspective).
60. See infra Section IV.A.
61. See, e.g., ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1219–23 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ormco
Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
62. See Duffy, Inventing Invention, supra note 42, at 34.
63. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 201; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
64. See Frank D. Prager, Standards of Patentable Invention from 1474 to 1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV.
69, 69 (1952) (“[O]ur judges and patent examiners agree that ‘invention,’ in addition to plain
novelty and utility, is one of the important prerequisites of a valid patent.”).
65. See Duffy, Inventing Invention, supra note 42, at 2 (“Though nonobviousness is the most
recently developed of the three requirements for obtaining a patent, it is now generally
considered to be the defining feature of invention.”); Pierce, supra note 6, at 557–75 (discussing
the early history of the “invention” requirement). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss
Unobviousness Standard: Early Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 103 (2005)
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be new and economically useful.66 Accordingly, from the early days of the U.S.
patent system, some courts sought to impose a patentability standard beyond
novelty and utility.67 Purporting to summarize this law, Willard Phillips stated
in his 1837 treatise that “[a]n invention may be slight and trivial as being so
obvious and apparent that it cannot be considered a discovery”68 and
maintained that this “defect” renders a patent invalid.69
Although historians have questioned the existence of a general
nonobviousness standard in early nineteenth-century U.S. patent law,70 the
Supreme Court held in no uncertain terms in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, decided
in 1851, that an invention may be unpatentable even if novel and useful.71
The patent at issue was directed to a doorknob made of clay or porcelain,
which was adapted with a cavity for inserting a special shank that enabled a
connection to a door.72 Metal and wooden doorknobs having this construction
were known, and the clay and porcelain materials have been around for
centuries.73 However, the inventors were the first to make clay and porcelain
doorknobs with this structure, and asserted that the new knobs were “cheaper
and better” than those in the prior art.74 But the Court was unmoved and
invalidated the patent. It held that “[t]he difference [from the prior art] is

[hereinafter Walterscheid, Judicial Activism] (detailing the development of the nonobviousness
standard from “invention”).
66. See generally Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875) (giving a constitutional foundation
to a patentability requirement beyond novelty and utility).
67. One way they did that, besides creating the invention requirement, is by imposing a
standard of substantial novelty rather than strict novelty. See Duffy, Inventing Invention, supra note
42, at 18–19; Pierce, supra note 6, at 579–82.
68. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 142 (Boston, Am. Stationers’ Co.
1837).
69. Id.; see also id. at 126 (“To permit a formal, trivial change in an article to be patentable
. . . would defeat the beneficial operation of the statute and in effect repeal it.”). A modern
casebook calls the Phillips formulation “the first general articulation of the obviousness doctrine
anywhere in the world.” MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 525.
70. See Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional
Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 198–99 (1989); Pierce, supra note 6, at 619; Edward C.
Walterscheid, Graham v. John Deere Co. in a Different Light, 51 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 649,
690 (2011); Walterscheid, Judicial Activism, supra note 65, at 113; see also Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas.
254, 255–56 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247) (Story, Circuit Justice) (rejecting any “invention”
requirement beyond novelty and utility); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 524–26 (discussing
early case law rejecting the invention requirement).
71. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851). For an illuminating
background of Hotchkiss, see Joseph P. Fishman, Originality’s Other Path, 109 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 32–35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3620118
[https://perma.cc/MJV8-4MSC].
72. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 264.
73. Id. at 264–65.
74. Id. at 266.
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formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention,”75 and that “the improvement
is the work of the skilful [sic] mechanic, not that of the inventor.”76
Hotchkiss paved the way for patent denials for lack of “invention.”77 But
perhaps because the opinion did not set out a framework for deciding when
a patent embodies a contribution greater than that of a “mechanic,” its precise
impact was difficult to discern.78 In the wake of Hotchkiss, courts struggled to
develop a standard for what constitutes invention beyond the fact-bound
proposition that mere substitution of one material for another without any
“peculiar effect” is unpatentable.79
One notable subsequent opinion, Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite,80
arguably went beyond Hotchkiss, pointing the way to a more generally
applicable standard of invention and flagging the kinds of evidence that
might be important for that inquiry. In upholding the validity of a patent on
a method of setting artificial teeth, the Supreme Court focused on the
struggles that the field of dentistry had experienced in coming up with the
claimed solution:
To find a material, with a mode of using it, capable of being
combined with the teeth in such a manner as to be free from the
admitted faults of all other known combinations, had been an object
long and earnestly sought. It had been a subject for frequent
discussion among dentists and in scientific journals. The properties
of vulcanite were well known; but how to make use of them for
artificial sets of teeth remained undiscovered, and apparently
undiscovable [sic], until [the inventor] revealed the mode.81

75. Id.
76. Id. at 267. For an extended critique of Hotchkiss, see George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C.
§ 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
437, 460–62 (1999). For a recent rehabilitation of Hotchkiss, see Craig Allen Nard, Patent Law’s
Purposeful Ambiguity, 87 TENN. L. REV. 187, 195–96 (2019).
77. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 197 (1876); Leonard v. Lovell, 29 F. 310, 314
(C.C.W.D. Mich. 1886); Teese v. Phelps, 23 F. Cas. 832, 833 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 13,819).
78. See Kitch, New Standards for Patents, supra note 53, at 309; see also Burchfiel, supra note
70, at 204–05 (maintaining that even Justice Samuel Nelson, the author of Hotchkiss, gave that
opinion a narrow reading in his subsequent invention decisions); Pierce, supra note 6, at 579
(evaluating the cases following Hotchkiss to understand that opinion’s impact); Walterscheid,
Judicial Activism, supra note 65, at 104 (noting a nearly two-decade period before the test set forth
in Hotchkiss was used to invalidate a patent).
79. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 266–67; see Charles Hain Werner, Invention in Patent
Law 15–24 (1895) (LL.B. thesis, Cornell University), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
historical_theses/58 [https://perma.cc/82L5-7XUC] (attempting to distill workable principles
from post-Hotchkiss case law).
80. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
81. Id. at 495; see 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 122,
at 174–76 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890) (discussing the value of such evidence in invention
cases).
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In line with these observations, Goodyear suggested that a showing that the
claimed subject matter was somehow not within a PHOSITA’s ready grasp
during the period when the patentee came up with it was generally probative
of patentability.82 This analytical move both provided a path for distinguishing
the facts of Hotchkiss from those involving the patent at issue83 and served as
an important elaboration of that precedent,84 offering an approach to judging
patentability beyond the context of substitution of a prior art material. But
while the Goodyear framework had the potential to grow into a workable test
of invention that took into account the PHOSITA’s perspective at the relevant
time, its deployment was far from uniform.85 By the mid-twentieth century,
the Court appeared to embrace a different, “deeply subjective”86 approach to
the invention requirement.87 This so-called “flash of creative genius”
standard88 led to widespread dissatisfaction in the patent bar, which pled with
Congress to curtail this latest line of cases.89
B. GRAHAM
The reformers’ efforts ultimately led to a refashioning of invention as the
codified requirement of nonobviousness in the Patent Act of 1952.90 In 1966,
the Supreme Court interpreted this provision for the first time in Graham v.
John Deere.91 The Court concluded that, in adopting § 103, Congress had
meant largely to keep the invention case law,92 avoided creating any “relaxed
standard” of patentability,93 and only rejected the “flash of creative genius”
standard.94 Nevertheless, Graham’s discussion of the precedent was so limited
that the opinion seemingly reset the law back to the square one of Hotchkiss,

82. Goodyear, 93 U.S. at 495–97.
83. Id. at 496.
84. Id. at 492.
85. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 76, at 195–98 (noting the generally inconsistent application
of the obviousness tests); cf. Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 47, at 78–79 (noting the
difficulties that subjective inquiries into obviousness may create).
86. Nard, supra note 76, at 196.
87. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150–54 (1950);
Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90–92 (1941).
88. Cuno Eng’g, 314 U.S. at 91; see also John F. Duffy & Robert P. Merges, The Story of Graham
v. John Deere Company: Patent Law’s Evolving Standard of Creativity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STORIES 109, 118–19 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (describing the
“flash of creative genius” test).
89. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 531 (discussing the movement “to end the confusion
surrounding the invention requirement”).
90. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018)).
91. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
92. See id. at 14–15.
93. See id. at 19.
94. See id. at 15.
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without incorporating insights from later decisions like Goodyear.95 Moreover,
the one significant substantive move that Graham did make, which was to
introduce the phrase “secondary considerations” into obviousness law, was
rather unprecedented and ended up sowing the confusion that this Article
seeks to sort out.
1. Background
The opinion captioned as Graham v. John Deere is actually a part of a
“trilogy” of Supreme Court cases, decided on the same day, that constitute the
foundation of the modern nonobviousness requirement.96 The technology in
Graham itself involved so-called “chisel” plows, which were designed to
withstand resistance from stones and other obstructions in the soil, that were
invented and patented by one William Graham.97 A prior art plow (pictured
below on the left), also invented by Graham, addressed the problem of plow
shank damage caused by rocky soil by attaching the shank to the plow frame
with a hinge-like clamp equipped with a spring mechanism, with the whole
assembly acting as a kind of a shock absorber.98 In the prior art configuration,
the shank was positioned between the hinge plate and the plow frame.99 That
solution, however, suffered from certain drawbacks, including wear and tear
on the frame and, perhaps, damage to the shank because of restriction on its
flexing due to the plate’s position.100

In the patent under review, Graham purportedly addressed these
problems by placing the shank below the hinge plate, rather than above, to
95. See Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Supreme
Court’s New Patent Obviousness Standard in KSR Should Be Readily Apparent and Benefit the Public, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 127, 174–76 (2007).
96. Mandel, Excessive Patent Grants, supra note 4, at 65–70. The trilogy actually includes four
cases—Graham, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co.,
which are reported together with Graham, and United States v. Adams, reported separately. Graham,
383 U.S. 1; United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966). However, the two Cook Chemical cases
concern the same patent that was asserted against two separate defendants, so the trilogy ultimately
involves three patents.
97. Graham, 383 U.S. at 21.
98. Id. at 22–24.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 23 & n.11, 25 & n.13.
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make a “free-flex” structure instead (pictured above on the right), and by
adding a “stirrup” to limit wear on the frame and further reduce the strain on
the shank.101 As it turned out, however, another prior art clamp, Glencoe, also
included such a stirrup, though its shank was above the hinge plate just as in
Graham’s old clamp.102 Thus, the shank’s placement was the only feature of
the claimed invention distinguishing it from the prior art. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that this claim would have been
obvious over Graham’s own prior patent and the Glencoe clamp,103 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Graham and in the companion Cook
Chemical and Adams cases in order to set down a definitive interpretation of
§ 103.104
The Court held that “the 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial
precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in
Hotchkiss,”105 which in turn called for a comparison “between the subject
matter of the patent . . . and the background skill of the calling.”106 But
Graham did not elaborate on this test.107 In a much-quoted passage that came
to be known as the exposition of the so-called “Graham factors,” the Court
simply parroted the fact findings required by § 103, explaining that “the scope
and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art resolved.”108 It then announced that “[a]gainst this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined.”109 This framework left much to be desired because it failed to
explain how these factors, which are really just fact findings, bear on the
conclusion of patentability.110
2. Primary-Secondary Framework
Graham, to be sure, went beyond the language of § 103. Adding a fourth
factor, the Court casually noted that “[s]uch secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might
101. Id. at 37; see also id. at 20–22 (discussing the role of the stirrup in the patent at issue relative
to the prior art).
102. Id. at 25–26.
103. John Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 1964).
104. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4–5; see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966)
(companion case).
105. Graham, 383 U.S at 3–4.
106. Id. at 12.
107. The Court explained that the second sentence of § 103, “[p]atentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made,” was meant to foreclose the abovementioned subjective “flash of creative genius” test—which the Graham Court characterized as
merely “a rhetorical embellishment.” Id. at 13, 15 & n.7; see supra notes 87–95 and accompanying text.
108. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
109. Id.
110. See Chiang, supra note 9, at 49–50; Miller, Looking Back, supra note 9, at 9.
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be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented.”111 It explained that, “[a]s indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy,”112
presumably to bolster patent validity. Over time, other types of evidence came
to be recognized as coming within the ambit of Graham’s “etc.” They include
expert skepticism, industry praise, copying of the patented invention,
(sometimes) unexpected results or properties of the claimed invention,113
and—the only secondary consideration that counts against validity—nearsimultaneous invention of the claimed subject matter by others.114
This language, finally, signaled something seemingly new:115 No court
prior to Graham divided the facts introduced on the issue of obviousness into
“secondary considerations”116 and others—presumably, primary ones.117 The
Court explained that such indicia are useful for the § 103 inquiry because
they are more easily understandable to lay decision-makers than the “the
highly technical facts” encompassed in the first three factors.118 In addition, it
noted that because their historical-fact character may objectively demonstrate
the merits of the claimed invention,119 secondary considerations can help
restrain the human tendency to find obviousness through an exercise of

111. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
112. Id. at 18 (citing Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964)). Some commentators suggested that
the “may have relevancy” language signals that the Court thought of this evidence as categorically
less important than the prior art. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So
Obvious After All: Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA.
L. REV. 41, 64 (2012). But the Court was merely stating a legal truism—all potential evidence may
or may not have relevancy. See FED. R. EVID. 401; see also Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the
“Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26, 38 (1972) (“Well of course [secondary considerations]
do have relevancy and the Supreme Court itself applied them in the Adams Case.”).
113. See infra notes 289–300 and accompanying text (cataloguing courts’ struggles with
classifying unexpected results).
114. See Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use
of Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2077 (2011).
115. See Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 364; cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra
note 54, at 84 & n.216 (cataloguing the literature that discussed the role of non-prior art and
non-technical evidence in opinions involving § 103 and the invention requirement, none of
which used the “secondary” label).
116. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 48; Thomas, supra note 114, at 2075.
117. For an example of an opinion juxtaposing the terms “primary considerations” and
“secondary considerations,” see Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA),
Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1966).
119. The absence of secondary considerations, however, is generally not considered to be
probative of obviousness. See infra note 460 and accompanying text.
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hindsight.120 This nod to a recurring problem in § 103 jurisprudence was
Graham’s only attempt to grapple with timing.121
But where did the primary-secondary framework come from and why was
non-prior art evidence bracketed out as a separate factor? The Court cited a
student note by Richard Robbins, as well as some lower-court decisions, to
support this classification.122 The Robbins note perceptively identified the use
of evidence such as commercial success of the patented product and failure
of others to come up with the claimed solution in § 103 cases, explaining that
“[t]he focus of these inquiries is upon economic and motivational rather than
technical issues.”123 Nonetheless, in the view of Robbins and of the opinions
he discussed, evidence outside the prior art was simply a way to ease the highly
technical challenge of determining obviousness,124 as opposed to a distinct
“secondary consideration.” Notably, neither the Robbins note nor any of the
§ 103 decisions referenced in it used this phrase. It is possible, perhaps, that
by “secondary” the Court simply meant “extrastatutory,” but the opinion never
made this point clear.125
Moreover, although non-technical and other non-prior art evidence
frequently came up in pre-1952 cases applying the invention requirement,
including in the Goodyear decision analyzed above,126 Graham cited no opinion
endorsing any formal grading of evidence as primary or secondary, and no
such precedent appears to exist. It is, of course, the Court’s prerogative to
create new precedent, but Graham did not suggest that it was making a major
break with the invention case law—which, as the Court held, § 103 had largely
codified.127 Nevertheless, Graham said what it said, and the “secondary
considerations” language launched something of an accidental revolution.

120. Graham, 383 U.S. at 35–36.
121. See In re Sporck, 301 F.2d 686, 689 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (warning tribunals to take care “to
view the prior art without reading into that art the teachings of appellant’s invention”); Mandel,
Hindsight Bias, supra note 57, at 1420–21; Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness:
Applying the Pioneer Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 390 (2001). But cf. Eisenberg,
Obvious to Whom, supra note 16, at 887–90 (arguing that the Federal Circuit sometimes
overcompensated in its goal to prevent hindsight bias); Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at
43–47 (similar).
122. See 1 JANICE M. MUELLER, MUELLER ON PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
§ 9.02[C][2][b], at 9-19 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court gleaned from § 103 (and, rather
remarkably, a law student-written article) the . . . four factors that have come to be essential to
every nonobviousness analysis . . . .”).
123. Robbins, supra note 112, at 1172.
124. Id.
125. I thank Jonathan Darrow for suggesting that I make this observation. Cf. Rich, supra note
112, at 38–39 (bemoaning the term “secondary”).
126. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
127. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966); see supra notes 90–94 and
accompanying text.
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Thus, lower courts and the PTO have had to intuit the significance of the
distinction between the two types of evidence into the present day.128
“Intuit” is a word that was chosen intentionally. While the Court
lamented “a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent
Office and by the courts,”129 it gave these tribunals little to go on in their quest
for uniformity. Moreover, the Court’s validity analysis added little, if any,
useful guidance130—and worse yet, Graham did not even rely very much on its
own framework in when it actually decided whether the patents at issue were
valid under § 103. In determining that Graham’s patent would have been
obvious, the Court did compare his invention to the prior art, thus addressing
the “differences” factor, but it did not even mention the level of ordinary skill
in the art, nor any secondary considerations.131 The Court, moreover, did not
deal with the problem of hindsight and never explained why the differences
were too small for the claim to be patentable as of the relevant time. It only
observed tersely that
[c]ertainly a person having ordinary skill in the prior art, given the
fact that the flex in the shank could be utilized more effectively if
allowed to run the entire length of the shank, would immediately see
that the thing to do was what Graham did, i.e., invert the shank and
the hinge plate.132
Problematically, the Court failed to point to any evidence in the record
that demonstrated why a PHOSITA would have realized that flexing was a
technical challenge that needed to be addressed,133 and its assertion that a

128. This Article focuses on courts and the PTO, but other tribunals empowered to make
judgments on patent validity, including the Court of Federal Claims and the International Trade
Commission, must also deal with this standard.
129. Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
130. See Chiang, supra note 9, at 49–50 (“The opinion gave all the appearance of expecting
a solution to appear out of thin air once the formula was followed. The lack of an articulable rule
meant that determinations of obviousness took the appearance—and arguably the reality—of
resting on judicial whim, where the validity of a patent was heavily dependent on the court that
was deciding the case, a result that the drafters of section 103 had clearly sought to avoid.”
(footnotes omitted)). This Article focuses on the Graham patent, but the Court’s analysis of the
Cook Chemical patent is similarly spare. Graham, 383 U.S. at 34–37; see Duffy & Merges, supra
note 88, at 134 (discussing the Cook Chemical part of the Graham opinion).
131. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 163–64 (3d ed.
2019). Duffy and Merges explain that Graham did not put forward any evidence of secondary
considerations (because he did not market the patented product), but the Court did not even
mention this point. Duffy & Merges, supra note 88, at 140–41.
132. Graham, 383 U.S. at 25.
133. Cf. Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 377,
433 (2017) [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Innovation Failures] (addressing the importance of
problem recognition for nonobviousness).
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PHOSITA “would immediately see” the claimed invention was conclusory.134
Commenting on Graham’s approach, Glynn Lunney and Christian Johnson
noted that it embodies the very hindsight reconstruction of the claimed
invention from the prior art that the Court had spoken out against earlier in
the opinion.135 In addition, they observed that Graham’s cursory treatment of
secondary considerations is difficult to reconcile with its own statements that
they can be a critical guard against hindsight bias.136 These insights confirm
that the Court did not do much to grapple with the issue of time in the § 103
inquiry, nor to clarify the role of secondary considerations in the application
of the Graham factors.
3. The Court’s Failure to Apply the Graham Framework in Adams
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the patent asserted against the
government by Bert Adams, the one patent in the trilogy that was upheld,137
only added to the muddle because the Court appeared to walk away from its
own framework in Graham. Thus, in considering the claims to a battery
employing a water-soluble electrolyte operating in conjunction with a
magnesium electrode, the Court made very little use of the approach it had
articulated in the immediately preceding pages of the U.S. Reporter.138
Concluding that the patent would have been nonobvious, Adams instead
focused primarily on the fact that an operational “wet” (i.e., water-based)
battery was an unexpectedly good result—the product of a research path that,
experience suggested, was unlikely to be fruitful.139
Adams intimated that evidence which, in today’s patent jargon, would be
said to “teach away” from the claim (i.e., to indicate that the path toward the
invention should not be taken) may be key to solving the § 103 puzzle.140 It
explained “that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally
discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into account in
determining obviousness.”141 Furthermore, patentability was supported by the
fact “that at the time Adams perfected his invention noted experts expressed
disbelief in it,” in part because the relevant prior art batteries “cannot be used

134. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 131, at 163–64 (noting the scantiness of Graham’s
analysis and contending that the Court’s “application of the law to the particular patents at issue
seems problematic”).
135. Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at 90–91.
136. Id. at 87.
137. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52 (1966).
138. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (setting forth the primarysecondary framework).
139. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51–52.
140. See infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text.
141. Adams, 383 U.S. at 52. In addition, Adams somewhat mixes up the concepts of novelty
and nonobviousness. Id. at 49–52. See generally Pierce, supra note 6 (discussing similarities between
novelty and nonobviousness).
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as sources of power.”142 Although the Court did not cite to it, Adams’s analysis
resembled the approach in Goodyear in focusing on the difficulties that the
field had experienced in coming up with the claimed solution and on
crediting the inventor for overcoming the challenges in the prior art to the
surprise of many experts.143 In sum, Adams prevailed in significant part
because his technical achievement was thought infeasible prior to (and even
after!) his invention.144
The Adams Court addressed the prior art and the differences between it
and the claims at length—for example, it discussed batteries with zinc
electrodes and explained how zinc is chemically unlike magnesium.145 But an
examination of other factors identified in Graham, particularly secondary
considerations, is nowhere to be found in the Adams opinion. For example,
the Robbins note included industry skepticism146 and “professional
approval”147 as evidence bolstering patentability that could be characterized
as secondary,148 and such evidence played a large role in Adams.149 Nevertheless,
the Court did not mention Robbins (nor the relevant discussion in Graham)
and did not make clear which category the skepticism and approval evidence
fell into. Conversely, the notions of unexpected results or of teaching away
did not appear either in Graham or in the Robbins note, but seemed to be all
but decisive in Adams. When analyzing this evidence, too, the Adams Court did
not apply or even mention the primary-secondary divide, making the
disconnect with Graham palpable.
We will soon see that teaching away and its inverses, such as suggestions
for modifying the prior art and other evidence tending to establish a
motivation to pursue the claimed invention, have now become central
concepts in the law of § 103.150 As courts have recognized in subsequent cases,

142. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51–52.
143. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
144. Adams, 383 U.S. at 52 (discussing various signals in the art that “would . . . deter any
investigation into such a combination as is used by Adams”). To be sure, skepticism after the
invention has been shown to work is ex post, and is in that sense more similar to praise. Perhaps,
to distinguish pre-filing industry skepticism that the path toward the invention would be
unproductive from a refusal to believe that the invention actually works, we should be using terms
“skepticism” and “disbelief,” respectively. Cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 72
(addressing ex post skepticism).
145. Adams, 383 U.S. at 46, 48–49.
146. See Robbins, supra note 112, at 1182 (“[I]f before the issuance of a patent an expert had
maintained that what the patentee in fact did could not be done, an inference of nonobviousness
would be entirely justified.”).
147. Id. at 1181–82. Robbins likewise noted that “failure of other investigators to solve the
problem solved by a patentee is evidence of a longfelt demand” that can count toward validity.
Id. at 1180; see also id. at 1174 (discussing this evidence further).
148. These types of evidence are now generally treated as part of the secondary
considerations. See infra notes 308–11 and accompanying text.
149. See Adams, 383 U.S. at 51–52.
150. See infra Section II.C.
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this kind of evidence properly focuses the obviousness inquiry on the
cognitive and technical barriers facing a PHOSITA at the relevant time. This
feature makes Adams the most contemporary third of the trilogy, but it also
creates a challenge to fit this opinion’s insights within the Graham framework.
In all, lower courts have not fully appreciated that Adams sidestepped
Graham’s primary-secondary framework and adopted a more nuanced
analytical approach: The Court in Adams “traveled back in time” to examine
the field’s difficulties with the problems ultimately solved by the patent.
C. LIFE AFTER GRAHAM: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND KSR
Although the Graham trilogy resolved several important issues,151 it left
many questions open and gave the PTO and lower courts no choice but to
muddle through.152 The Supreme Court issued three obviousness opinions in
the decade following Graham, but they added little clarity or guidance.153 The
disuniformity154 in the application of patent law across the United States,
often manifested by courts’ inconsistent approaches to § 103, eventually led
Congress to intervene once again. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 stripped the regional circuits of jurisdiction over appeals of cases arising
under the Patent Act and created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which now hears almost every patent appeal in the country.155

151. For example, the Court ruled that § 103 did not lower the substantive standard of
patentability relative to the pre-codification case law. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
152. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a National
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1984) (detailing the inconsistent approaches to § 103
among the lower courts); Rich, supra note 112, at 28 (similar); see also Jason Rantanen & Lee
Petherbridge, Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2009 (2014) (“The picture that emerged was
one of an awkward legal infrastructure. The patent office and its reviewing court, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, developed and applied standards of patentability to decide whether
patents should validly issue, and the regional circuit courts developed and applied their own
different standards to determine whether a given patent had validly issued.”). See generally
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1989) (discussing the institutional role of the Federal Circuit).
153. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 567–68 (discussing Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); and Sakraida v.
Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)); cf. Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent
Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1051,
1061–62 (1991) (suggesting that these opinions cemented the primary-secondary distinction).
154. Senator Roman L. Hruska, Address at the First Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Apr. 30, 1974), in 65 F.R.D. 171, 209 (1974); see also
COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199 (1975) (calling for the
establishment of a national patent court of appeals); Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use
of Secondary Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L.
REV. 357, 374 (1987) (explaining “that Congress intended the Federal Circuit to establish
uniform standards in the patent law area”).
155. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
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1. Entrenchment of the Cognitive Approach
The Federal Circuit’s takeover of patent law is widely seen as having
driven the jurisprudence of § 103 in a decidedly pro-patent direction soon
after its creation.156 As particularly relevant to this Article, the new appellate
court elevated the status of secondary considerations so as to sometimes weigh
them heavily in the patentee’s favor157 and, more notoriously, crafted the socalled teaching-suggestion-motivation (“TSM”) test.158 As Lee Petherbridge
and Polk Wagner explained, TSM demanded that “somewhere within the full
scope of the relevant prior art, the claimed subject matter must be sufficiently
taught or suggested that it would have been easily perceived by a person of
ordinary skill in the art.”159 In the test’s more rigorous instantiations, the
entity challenging the patent had to identify specifically, and preferably with
documentary evidence such as a passage in a reference, why a PHOSITA
would seek to modify a key piece of prior art or combine it with another one
to arrive at the claimed invention.160
The TSM test was criticized widely and on numerous grounds. Among
other things, many commentators took the Federal Circuit to task for its
dubious construction of a PHOSITA as an entity incapable of creative insight,
which forced the PTO, trial judges, and juries to ignore common sense or
even tacit knowledge as potential sources of information (and motivation) in
the inventive process.161 The Federal Circuit was thus faulted for sanctioning
the proliferation of patents on technically trivial inventions,162 which is the
156. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 17–26 (2003).
157. Id. at 19–21; see, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
158. See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Lunney, supra note 156, at 21–22; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 131, at 166. Antecedents of
the test date back to the time of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, one of the Federal
Circuit’s predecessor courts. See Smith & Van Thomme, supra note 95, at 174–76.
159. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 10, at 2062; see, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480
F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Subsumed within the Graham factors is a subsidiary requirement
articulated by this court that . . . a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the
teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan
would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.”); Christopher A. Cotropia,
Nonobviousness as an Exercise in Gap Measuring, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 9, at 21.
160. See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Our case law makes clear
that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness
analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to
combine prior art references.”), abrogated on other grounds by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
161. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom, supra note 16, at 894–95; Lunney, supra note 156,
at 21–22.
162. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9–15 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-andpolicy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/K64A-HQ7W].
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very problem that the nonobviousness requirement was created to address.163
Moreover, a number of commentators maintained that the court did not
clearly articulate how the TSM test fit within the Graham framework.164
TSM did, however, speak to one of the concerns mentioned in Graham
and raised throughout the history of obviousness165—hindsight bias—which
involves “the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the
invention in issue.”166 This psychological phenomenon is well-documented,167
and Gregory Mandel found evidence consistent with its influence on § 103
analysis.168 Once the invention is actually disclosed to a decision-maker or an
expert, the process of getting to it appears much more straightforward than
when it is not yet known.169 In view of the widely acknowledged difficulties of
judging obviousness based on the state of the art in the past,170 as the statute
requires, the TSM test was the new court’s responsive attempt to ensure “that
the determination of obviousness is to be ascertained at the [relevant]
time.”171
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s implementation of TSM was
controversial, and the Supreme Court finally addressed it in 2007 in the
seminal case of KSR International v. Teleflex.172 The Court “beg[a]n by rejecting
the rigid approach of the [Federal Circuit]”173 and criticized the lower court
for preventing decision-makers from relying on a PHOSITA’s “common
sense.”174 Still, KSR ultimately recognized the Federal Circuit’s attempt to
grapple with the problem of hindsight. The Court observed that the TSM test
“captured a helpful insight” into obviousness175 and explained that the
question of what “would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention

163. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
164. Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at 63–65; Rhodes, supra note 153, at 1066–68.
165. See, e.g., Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881).
166. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
167. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 571, 571 (1998).
168. See Mandel, Hindsight Bias, supra note 57, at 1399–400.
169. Id.
170. But see generally Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112 (arguing for a different approach to
obviousness that openly incorporates hindsight considerations).
171. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 10, at 2062; see also Lee Petherbridge, On the
Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893, 914–19 (2010) (explaining that the TSM test
was an important contribution to the law of obviousness).
172. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Some of the considerations for the
§ 103 inquiry adopted in KSR were presaged in the work of Robert Merges. See Merges, Commercial
Success, supra note 53, at 874–75 (analyzing evidence of “demand-side factors” tending to show
obviousness, which are equivalent to the evidence that the Supreme Court later framed as design
need and market pressure).
173. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
174. Id. at 420–22.
175. Id. at 418–19.
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does”176 can be highly pertinent to the § 103 inquiry. Moreover, KSR noted
that “[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the
TSM test and the Graham analysis.”177 In sum, while holding that the Federal
Circuit adopted an overly narrow conception of what can properly count as
evidence of the state of the art at the time of filing,178 KSR acknowledged and
qualifiedly endorsed the lower court’s effort to fill a doctrinal gap left open
by Graham.
In doing so, the Supreme Court broke significant new ground. While
discussing what the Federal Circuit did right and wrong, KSR scrutinized the
challenges of inventing and attempted to provide a comprehensive approach
for deciding whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious at
the relevant time.179 Although KSR is a difficult case to distill to a simple
rule,180 the opinion’s guidance—as filtered by the Federal Circuit181—supports
the cognitive framework for determining obviousness that was discussed in the
Introduction.182 This approach asks tribunals to decide if a PHOSITA would
have had a reason to modify or combine prior art references to achieve the
claimed invention and to reasonably expect success in getting to this goal at

176. Id. at 418.
177. Id. at 419.
178. See Justin Lee, Note, How KSR Broadens (Without Lowering) the Evidentiary Standard of
Nonobviousness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 15 (2008) (“The general thrust of the [KSR] opinion
can, and should, be interpreted to broaden the type of evidence that can be used to support a
finding of obviousness, without discarding the decades of Federal Circuit precedent requiring
rigorous evidence guarding against hindsight bias.”); cf. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital
Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (adopting a wide-ranging evidentiary inquiry
for nonobviousness). The substantive consequence of the broadened evidentiary standard, however,
appears to be a somewhat higher nonobviousness hurdle for inventors to overcome. See John M.
Golden, Remedies and Procedure: Patent Law’s Continuing Frontiers, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
290, 291–92 (2018) (“The United States Supreme Court [in KSR] appears to have caused an
uptick in the stringency of patent law’s demand that an invention be nonobvious in order to be
patentable, but this uptick seems more in the nature of a marginal change than in the nature of
a major watershed.” (footnote omitted)).
179. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law After KSR, 20
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 391, 424 (2014) [hereinafter Cotropia, Predictability] (explaining
that the purpose of § 103, as recognized in KSR, is to reward “risks of journeying down a
development path that an ordinary skilled artisan would not have taken”); see also Robert P.
Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 40–41 (1992) [hereinafter
Merges, Uncertainty] (discussing pre-KSR “cases involv[ing] prior art which suggests that a certain
area should be investigated, and yet the resulting invention is either not suggested in the prior
art, or has unexpected properties” and concluding that “an invention is held obvious if the
resulting invention does not differ significantly from what was suggested in the prior art or if the
inventor was reasonably certain that she would succeed”).
180. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 66 (2010) (noting the openendedness of the KSR standards).
181. To be clear, the Federal Circuit has had to go to some lengths in its effort to reconcile
KSR’s framework with some of its own precedent. See Mark D. Janis, Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry
After KSR, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 335, 343–48 (2012).
182. See supra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
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the time of filing.183 Notably, this framework mirrors the analysis of whether
the invention would have been challenging to a PHOSITA that can be found
in Adams, on which KSR relied to some extent,184 and even in Goodyear,185
which the Court did not mention.
A frequently cited passage from KSR, which sets forth the so-called
“obvious to try” doctrine, captures these intuitions:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of
ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under
§ 103.186
This approach is highly cognizant of inventive challenges facing a
PHOSITA in the period leading up to filing. Much like a roadmap in a prior
art reference that suggests the making of the claimed invention, “a design
need or market pressure” may create a motivation or reason to work off the
prior art to pursue a desirable research goal.187 Further, the presence of “a
finite number of identified, predictable solutions” would generate a
reasonable expectation of achieving that goal.188 If the research leads to
“anticipated success”—i.e., if the invention can be made as a PHOSITA would
183. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2012). While the two subtests date back to the pre-KSR era, see Lee, supra note 178, at 22, 28–31,
the Federal Circuit has read KSR to broaden out the inquiry into the type of evidence for
establishing these elements. See, e.g., Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC, 918 F.3d
928, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness
Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 710 (2013) (“[W]hile the
underlying requirement that patent challengers identify some ‘reason to combine’ or ‘reason to
modify’ prior art references has endured, it is hardly a reincarnation of TSM, either in terms of
vigor or structure. Instead, the Federal Circuit’s new obviousness framework allows substantial
flexibility in the obviousness analysis.”).
184. See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing the parallels between KSR and Adams).
185. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
186. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). This principle applies even
when a PHOSITA would have no idea of the final form that the invention would take, but the
path to getting to a final product that would work for a desired purpose was clearly laid out. See,
e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology in
the Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 442–45 (2004) (criticizing some of the
Federal Circuit’s life-science obviousness case law prior to KSR and Kubin); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 1031–38 (2016) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Possession] (explaining that the “obvious to try” doctrine prohibits patents on
inventions that are constructively possessed by the public); Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at
98 (suggesting that the obviousness inquiry does not have to hinge on any specific solution to a
problem presented in the prior art).
187. Lee, supra note 178, at 41 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402).
188. Id. (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402).
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have predicted—then it is unworthy of a patent because the work required
little technological risk to undertake and presented no special cognitive
difficulty.189
As subtests of nonobviousness,190 these elements are contestable,191 but
they do serve as useful screens that largely put decision-makers on the right
track in their assessment of which inventions are deserving of patents. Because
it may be tough to measure the magnitude of the technical advance sufficient
for patentability,192 and likely even more difficult to decide if a particular
patent grant is economically justifiable, cognitive challenges and technological
risks are reasonable proxies for socially valuable patents.193 Indeed, if § 103
was meant to steer inventors toward non-trivial technical advances,194 then the
showings that a PHOSITA would have had reasons to pursue the invention
and that it worked more or less as one would have predicted are sensible ways
of establishing obviousness.195 Conversely, the greater the ex ante technological
risk,196 the more likely that the invention embodies a patentably significant
advance over the prior art as measured at the time of filing.197

189. See Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test for New Pharmaceutical Compounds:
Gobbledygook?, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 49, 63, 73 (2014) [hereinafter Rogers, Gobbledygook];
see also Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Serv. Parts, Inc., 532 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy,
J.) (“Even a minor change may produce a patentable invention, where the result could not have
been readily predicted beforehand by one skilled in the art.”).
190. I borrowed and adapted this term from Merges and Duffy, MERGES & DUFFY, supra note
2, at 567, who in turn must have borrowed and adapted it from Robbins, supra note 112.
191. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1661–67 (positing an alternative, economic
approach to § 103); Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 47, at 135–36 (explaining that the
current nonobviousness tests reflect a panoply of considerations); cf. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55,
89–95 (2003) (showing how certain features of the nonobviousness requirement protect reliance
of interests of non-patentees, but noting that certain evidence—particularly, commercial
success—does not clearly appear to serve this goal). See generally Lunney & Johnson, supra note
112 (discussing the ways in which the motivation and reasonable expectation of success elements
may be objectionable).
192. Fromer, supra note 45, at 1487–92.
193. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 44, at
277 (“[I]nventions that are risky to make are considered nonobvious.”).
194. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
195. Cf. Cotropia, Predictability, supra note 179, at 427–30 (showing how a contrary approach
is open to the charge of impermissible hindsight).
196. See, e.g., Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 345 (7th Cir. 1983)
(explaining why researchers who decide to buck conventional wisdom often produce socially
valuable inventions); cf. Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 179, at 50–55 (focusing on market risk as
a proxy for patentability).
197. Landers, supra note 45, at 72 (“[C]ircumstances that require one to create a system, reformulate a problem or engage in a broad search invoke both risk and creative choice, and
therefore these conditions weigh in favor of finding the invention nonobvious.”).
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2. KSR’s Resolution and Uneasy Aftermath
KSR’s analysis of the validity of the patent claim at issue usefully illustrates
the cognitive approach in action. The claim was drawn, essentially, to
adapting a specialized, height-adjustable gasoline pedal in cars with a digital
sensor for metering fuel by placing the sensor on the pedal’s pivot point.198
But during the period leading up to filing,199 industry participants were
routinely modifying pedals with computer-aided fuel injectors, and the
automotive engineering field was even converging on the pivot point as the
preferred location for the sensors that control them.200 Moreover, analog
height-adjustable pedals were well-known, and no special barriers stood in the
way of adapting such pedals with the sensors.201
The Court looked at this evidence, acknowledged the general shift to
digital technology in cars, and concluded that the claimed invention was not
much of an intellectual leap. After noting that “[t]here . . . existed a
marketplace that created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to
electronic pedals, and the prior art taught a number of methods for achieving
this advance,” KSR held that the claim would have been obvious.202 This
analysis confirms that the defendant readily established both motivation
(based on the advantageous features of digital sensors for fuel injection) and
reasonable expectation of success (based on routine ways of equipping
various known analog gas pedals with such sensors), supporting the judgment
of invalidity. In sum, in resolving the case, the Court was faithful to its own
framework. Moreover, in further contrast with Graham, KSR was acutely aware
of the state of the art at the relevant time and cannot be faulted for relying on
hindsight.
KSR, however, did not have occasion to reconcile Graham’s primarysecondary heuristic with the cognitive framework because the patentee did
not proffer any relevant objective indicia. The Court only noted in passing
that, “[l]ike the District Court, . . . we conclude [that the patentee] has shown
no secondary factors to dislodge the determination that [the claim] is
obvious.”203 The district court’s opinion, in turn, suggested that the patentee
failed to prove up any nexus between its product’s commercial success, the
only secondary consideration it attempted to introduce, and the claim under

198. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 408, 410–11, 414 (2007).
199. Technically, the key date for establishing patentability under the version of the Patent
Act in force when KSR was decided was the date of the invention (if it could be proven) rather
than the filing date. See infra notes 356–58 and accompanying text (discussing the change from
first-to-invent to first-to-file in the AIA). Although the anchoring date has since changed from the
invention date to the effective filing date, the substantive reasoning of KSR is fully applicable to
the AIA’s first-to-file regime.
200. KSR, 550 U.S. at 408–10.
201. Id. at 420, 425–26.
202. Id. at 424.
203. Id. at 426.
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review.204 In particular, the patentee failed to establish which of the pedals
that were allegedly profitably sold actually incorporated the claimed feature,
an egregious failure of proof.205 As a result, the question of how secondary
considerations, if properly established, would have interacted with the
motivation and expectation elements (and impacted the ultimate validity
conclusion) was simply not raised by the facts of KSR. The baggage from
Graham thus remained unsorted.
So what are the possible ways to square the primary-secondary distinction
with KSR’s cognitive framework? On the one hand, it may be that the fact
finder is supposed to ascertain if a PHOSITA would have had technical
reasons to pursue the claimed invention and reasonably expected success
based on the prior art disclosures alone, and then decide if those
determinations are outweighed by objective indicia so as to save the claim.206
On the other hand, as even Graham appeared to recognize in passing by
calling this evidence “motivational,”207 secondary considerations such as
failure of others and industry skepticism can sometimes bear in a
straightforward way on the motivation to pursue the claimed invention.
Accordingly, maybe this evidence should be built into the structure of the
initial inquiry of whether the claimed invention would have been readily
attainable by a PHOSITA.
The former framing seems rather stilted, especially given KSR’s
endorsement of “an expansive and flexible approach” to § 103 and its praise
for the value of largely non-technical (or at least non-prior art) evidence such
as design need or pressure208—i.e., “demand-side” objective factors209—in

204. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 595–96 (E.D. Mich. 2003); see In re
GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“For objective evidence [of secondary
considerations] to be accorded substantial weight, its proponent must establish a nexus between
the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the
concept of nexus).
205. KSR, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 595–96.
206. Sometimes, however, an obviousness challenge can fail without the need to get to
secondary considerations at all under either approach. Because the burden to prove that the
claim is unpatentable is on the entity arguing against patentability, a failure to show a sufficient
similarity between the prior art and the claimed invention to establish even a modicum of
motivation might thus end the case without the need for the applicant or patentee to introduce
any additional evidence. See, e.g., UCB, Inc. v. Watson Lab’ys Inc., 927 F.3d 1272, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because we
agree with the district court that the prior art would not have provided one of ordinary skill with
a reason or motivation to make [the claimed invention], we need not examine [the plaintiff’s]
evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness.”); cf. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048,
1051 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (discussing the burden-shifting process in the context of patent
examination).
207. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
208. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
209. See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 874–76.
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the obviousness inquiry. But if lower courts are to adopt the latter, integrated
approach, then why even bother with Graham’s distinction?210
* * *
Post-KSR, the Federal Circuit has struggled with these questions, and the
problem of secondary considerations continues to embody a doctrinal lacuna
that the court has not yet been able to fill.211 In 2016, it issued an en banc
decision, Apple v. Samsung, which was first discussed in the Introduction.212 In
Apple, the court reaffirmed the basic proposition that “[o]bjective indicia of
nonobviousness must be considered in every case where present.”213 Although
its general recognition of the probative value of non-prior art evidence is in
accord with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, Apple also appeared to
endorse a sequential primary-secondary inquiry when it stated “that evidence
of secondary considerations must be examined to determine its impact on the
first three Graham factors.”214 Besides the idea that such apparent “demotion”
of the fourth factor is in potential tension with KSR’s catholic approach to
obviousness evidence,215 the formulation is odd as a general matter: When
applying a multi-factor test, decision-makers usually consider the impact of
the various factors on the ultimate legal conclusion, not on one another.216
Judge Jimmie Reyna, dissenting in Apple, maintained that the Federal
Circuit “disagrees over the role objective indicia play in the court’s analysis of
the ultimate determination of obviousness.”217 Specifically, he flagged the
court’s internal division on two issues: “(1) whether an obviousness analysis
involving secondary considerations (or objective indicia of non-obviousness)
is a one- or two-step process and (2) how much weight to accord secondary
considerations in the obviousness analysis.”218

210. Sometimes courts don’t. See infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., J. Jeffrey Hawley, The Resurgence of “Secondary Considerations”, 16 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 1, 7–20 (2014) (explaining that the Federal Circuit is increasingly relying on secondary
considerations without a clear approach to how they matter); Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles
of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107, 158 tbl.4 (2019). As the next Section shows, the court’s
treatment of this evidence remains inconsistent.
212. See supra notes 17–34 and accompanying text.
213. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc).
214. Id. (citing Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
215. To be clear, KSR’s reference to secondary considerations as failing to “dislodge” the
conclusion of obviousness based on the other factors may support this view. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007). I believe, however, that this statement must be understood in the
context of the patentee’s failure to prove commercial success—and the rest of the KSR opinion
strongly endorses the value of non-prior art evidence. See infra Section III.C.2.
216. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–53 (1989) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958)).
217. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1089 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
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Part III unpacks these tensions and deals with Judge Reyna’s critiques of
the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent § 103 jurisprudence by proposing that the
court cut the Gordian knot. In short, it argues for a reading of Graham that
does not mandate dividing obviousness evidence into primary and secondary
tiers at all. Part III also shows that the Federal Circuit has taken some halting
steps toward this solution and even signaled a willingness to make a better
account of the timing of obviousness evidence in line with the proposal in
Part IV—which provides a time-based path for further reconciliation of
Graham and KSR.
III. THE CASE FOR ELIMINATING THE PRIMARY-SECONDARY FRAMEWORK
A. INTRACTABLE DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE ROLE OF OBJECTIVE INDICIA
1. The Basic Problem
It is no secret that the treatment of secondary considerations at the
Federal Circuit is highly panel-dependent, and that the court’s members can
be assigned to two distinct factions based on their views of this evidence.219 As
Judge Reyna suggested in Apple,220 the disagreements generally concern the
degree of integration of secondary considerations in the § 103 inquiry. In one
camp are the judges who believe that all obviousness evidence must be
holistically considered from the start lest the outcome—typically, patent
invalidation—be prejudged based on the prior art alone.221 In the other are
the judges who favor a two-step framework that initially relies on the first three
Graham factors to conclude if a PHOSITA would have pursued the claimed
invention, and only then considers the objective indicia.222
The Graham heuristic has even led to disagreements over the proper
semantic labeling for the fourth factor. Thus, although this Article uses these
terms interchangeably, some judges consistently prefer the phrase “objective
indicia” to “secondary considerations” to describe pro-patentee non-prior art
evidence.223 This alternative terminology is typically favored by those who
believe that such evidence should not be viewed as secondary in importance
to the prior art and wish to reinforce the notion that the real-world facts
underlying this factor are a critical counterweight to hindsight reconstruction

219. See, e.g., Hawley, supra note 211, at 23–25; see also Tony Pezzano & Michael Dougherty,
Fed. Circ. Judges Disagree on Section 103 Patent Validity, LAW360 (Nov. 29, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1104972/fed-circ-judges-disagree-on-section-103-patent-validity
[https://perma.cc/N5QX-PE8E] (exploring the Federal Circuit’s internal disagreements over
§ 103 evidence).
220. Apple, 839 F.3d at 1089 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
221. Hawley, supra note 211, at 5–6, 24–25.
222. Id. at 23–24.
223. Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the Unexpected, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1371–72 &
n.11 (2017).
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that may infect the primary inquiry.224 The term that a particular judge favors
is a fairly reliable predictor of his or her willingness to adopt the holistic
approach and assign high value to secondary considerations (sorry, “objective
indicia!”).225 These semantic squabbles are a symptom of a deep conflict
within the Federal Circuit,226 which is problematic because the court was
established in part to help bring uniformity to patent law.227
The conflict was on prominent display in Intercontinental Great Brands v.
Kellogg North America,228 decided less than a year after Apple. The patentee
argued that the trial court had improperly discounted objective indicia
—indeed, “wr[ote] off the patent before turning to” this evidence229—based
on the process that the court used to reach the conclusion of obviousness.
The district court first determined that a PHOSITA would have been
motivated to make the claimed invention because it “was addressed to a
known problem”230 in the relevant field, “nearly all of the [claim] elements
were found in one”231 piece of prior art, and “the technology is relatively
simple.”232 It then examined secondary considerations, but concluded that
they “do not overcome [the defendant’s] extremely strong prima facie
showing that the invention was obvious in light of”233 the prior art.
The Federal Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, affirmed. The majority explained
that “[t]he staged consideration undertaken by the district court . . . makes

224. See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Pat. Litig., 676
F.3d 1063, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207,
1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“That evidence is ‘secondary’ in time does not mean that it is secondary
in importance.”).
225. For further analysis of the utility of this evidence, see Duffy, Timing Approach, supra
note 9, at 369–70; and Matthew G. Sipe, Patent Law’s Philosophical Fault Line, 2019 WIS. L. REV.
1033, 1053–55.
226. This is not the only area of patent law, however, in which one finds the lack of uniformity
and, consequently, panel dependency at the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rising
Confusion About “Arising Under” Jurisdiction in Patent Cases, 69 EMORY L.J. 459, 465 (2019)
(jurisdiction); Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Nothing?,
71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 769–74 (2018) (§ 101 and designation of opinions as precedential); R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1163–78 (2004) (claim construction).
227. See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of the
Federal Circuit). But cf. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2007) (questioning the need for and value of uniformity
in patent law).
228. Intercont’l Great Brands LLC v. Kellogg N. Am. Co., 869 F.3d 1336, 1345–46 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
229. Id. at 1345 (quoting Non-Confidential Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Intercontinental
Great Brands LLC at 40, Intercont’l, 869 F.3d 1336 (Nos. 2015-2082, -2084)).
230. Intercont’l Great Brands LLC v. Kellogg N. Am. Co., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1035 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (quoting Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
231. Id. at 1042.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1041.
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sense within the motivation-to-combine framework”234 and is not erroneous
so long as the tribunal considers objective indicia before reaching its ultimate
judgment on § 103. It then noted that “[e]ven with a motivation proved, the
record may reveal reasons [based on objective indicia] that, after all, the court
should not conclude that the combination would have been obvious.”235 The
Federal Circuit thus allowed trial judges and juries to start the § 103 inquiry
by evaluating a “prima facie” case for motivation stemming solely from the
three prior art-focused Graham factors.236
Judge Reyna dissented. Arguing for a strong version of the holistic
approach, he maintained that “nothing in Graham or KSR requires courts to
analyze the first three Graham factors first . . . and only then examine”
secondary considerations.237 Judge Reyna contended that “[o]bjective indicia
of non-obviousness must be considered from the outset,”238 rather than after
a finding of motivation based solely on the primary factors. In his view, the
latter approach contradicted the precedent holding that “[o]bjective indicia
of non-obviousness . . . are not mere, after-the-fact considerations relegated
to secondary status,” but rather “essential safeguards against hindsight
bias.”239 Then, as he did in Apple,240 Judge Reyna highlighted the conflicts
within the Federal Circuit on these issues and bemoaned “mixed messages
coming from our court.”241
Indeed, the conflicts within the court are so deep that some language in
the Intercontinental majority opinion may (oddly enough) provide support for
the view that all the evidence in § 103 cases should be considered holistically.
Although it asserted that there is “no authority that requires consideration of
objective indicia as part of the motivation-to-combine factual analysis,”242 the
majority then cited no less an authority than KSR for the proposition that
“[t]he court should consider a range of real-world facts to determine ‘whether
there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue.’”243 Because real-world facts such as industry
skepticism or failure of others may help establish that a PHOSITA would be

234. Intercont’l, 869 F.3d at 1346.
235. Id. at 1347.
236. See id. at 1347–48. Reasonable expectation of success was not an issue in dispute on
appeal. See id. at 1343 n.4.
237. Id. at 1354 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).
238. Id. at 1357.
239. Id. at 1356 (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Pat.
Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1078–79 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); cf. In re Depomed, Inc., 680 F. App’x 947, 953
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (Reyna, J., concurring) (expressing similar concerns in the
context of post-issuance proceedings at the PTO).
240. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
241. Intercont’l, 869 F.3d at 1356 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).
242. Id. at 1346 (majority opinion).
243. Id. at 1344 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
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disinclined to pursue the claimed invention,244 it follows that their impact on
motivation should be properly considered concurrently with prior art
disclosures, and not merely in rebuttal.245 Nevertheless, the approach actually
endorsed by the majority appears to be in conflict with this reasoning.
2. Further Inconsistencies and Tentative Steps Toward Reform
A related tension is that even the judges who countenance a two-part
inquiry for motivation sometimes take a more holistic approach to reasonable
expectation of success, the second subtest of nonobviousness. For example,
Judge Richard Taranto, the author of Intercontinental, took a very different
tack to the primary-secondary framework in Institut Pasteur v. Focarino.246 That
decision holds that some secondary considerations can serve as “probative and
cogent evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have reasonably
expected [to arrive at the claimed invention].”247 Under this approach, which
arguably conflicts with that of Intercontinental, objective indicia are integrated
into the question of whether a PHOSITA would have had a reasonable
expectation of success, rather than used to rebut a prima facie finding that
this element is established based on the prior art.248

244. In this particular case, the proffered secondary considerations were of the ex post variety
(commercial success, industry praise, and copying), but the majority’s reasoning does not
distinguish ex ante and ex post evidence. Id. at 1347.
245. Id. at 1346. To be sure, the staged approach might be unavoidable during patent
examination as an information-forcing device, since patent examiners start out just with the prior
art and the claims desired by the applicant. See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride ExtendedRelease Capsule Pat. Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1077–80 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (endorsing the
holistic approach to obviousness in district court § 103 analysis and distinguishing it from the
PTO’s prima facie-rebuttal framework); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1448–49 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Plager, J., concurring) (discussing the examiner’s burden to prove unpatentability). But
cf. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (cautioning the PTO to avoid “analytical
fixation” on primary evidence). There is another difference between patent examination and
litigation based on timing that perhaps makes the problem of objective indicia less salient during
the former. Some evidence, like commercial success, may not even exist during prosecution, but
could come into being by the time the patent (assuming it issues) is litigated or reviewed at the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). See Durie & Lemley, supra note 3, at 995–98; Greg
Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 577 (2017) [hereinafter Reilly, Decoupling Patent
Law] (“In practice, secondary considerations are rarely relied on during patent acquisition both
because of the difficulty for examiners in identifying and developing evidence of real world
activities (as opposed to printed materials) and because secondary considerations tend to be ex
post factors that only arise after the patent is granted and the invention publicized and
marketed.”); see also infra notes 432–36 and accompanying text (addressing various issues with
commercial success evidence).
246. Institut Pasteur v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing the
potential probative value of ex post secondary considerations, especially licensing and praise, for
establishing a reasonable expectation of success—without limiting the analysis to only those types
of secondary considerations).
247. Id.
248. It may be that Judge Taranto is simply open to a variety of analytical methodologies for
deciding obviousness. Although this is not necessarily a bad thing, the lack of a uniform approach
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Institut Pasteur is not an outlier: In a high-profile decision, University of
California v. Broad Institute, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no
reasonable expectation of success in coming up with the genome-editing
method at issue because of the skepticism of experts and prior failures to
accomplish this goal.249 While in tension with cases like Intercontinental, and
perhaps even with the en banc Apple opinion,250 in treating objective indicia
as more than just rebuttal evidence, the approaches in Broad Institute251 and
Institut Pasteur are sensible. Like teaching away in the prior art, the evidence
that saved the patents at issue in those cases directly supported an inference
of a PHOSITA’s disbelief that the respective inventions could be achieved in
view of the knowledge available at the time of filing.252 In all, in addition to
highlighting an intra-circuit conflict in § 103 evidence analysis, the Broad
Institute and Institut Pasteur opinions demonstrate that nonobviousness can be
evaluated quite adequately without the primary and secondary silos.
Still, these cases illustrate the inconsistent treatment of § 103 evidence
and point to bigger problems. Thus, the tension over whether the obviousness
inquiry should be performed in one step or two is intertwined with the
substantive weighing of objective indicia against the prima facie evidence—the
second issue Judge Reyna flagged in his Apple dissent253 and one that is further
explored below.254 On the one hand, some panels assign little value to
secondary considerations, treating them as an afterthought in both time and
to objective indicia at the Federal Circuit has nevertheless caused confusion and unpredictability.
See, e.g., Pezzano & Dougherty, supra note 219; Jason D. Eisenberg & Todd C. Thurheimer, Second
Chances for Secondary Considerations—Hiding the “Novelty Ball”, STERNE KESSLER GOLDSTEIN & FOX
(Oct. 2017), https://www.sternekessler.com/news-insights/publications/second-chances-secondaryconsiderations-hiding-novelty-ball [https://perma.cc/8Z43-YSZ9] (“[T]he Federal Circuit has
repeatedly stewarded practitioners and jurists towards considering secondary considerations
throughout the obviousness analysis, rather than as an afterthought. Despite this guidance,
confusion remains, and at times, the PTAB and the federal courts continue to treat secondary
considerations as the black sheep of the Graham-factor family.”). Related, as I discuss in the next
Section, the primary/secondary distinction often leads to error.
249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir.
2018). While the precise question before the Federal Circuit was whether there existed an
“interference-in-fact” between the two sets of claims at issue, the court noted that “[w]hen an
interference-in-fact turns on whether one set of claims renders obvious the subject matter of
another set of claims, the standard of review mirrors that in an obviousness review.” Id. at 1291.
250. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text; see also Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d
1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Taranto, J.) (explaining that KSR “[r]eject[ed] a blinkered focus
on individual documents”).
251. Broad Institute did use the term “secondary consideration,” but only when referring to
the (pro-patent) evidence of near-simultaneous invention. See Broad Inst., 903 F.3d at 1295. Still,
the court suggested that this evidence, too, can bear directly on both motivation and on
reasonable expectation of success. See id. at 1296.
252. This approach is also in line with Adams, which did not use anything resembling a prima
facie/rebuttal framework. See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 42–52 (1966).
253. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Reyna, J., dissenting).
254. See infra Section III.B.
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substance relative to prior art-based evidence.255 On the other, there is Federal
Circuit precedent holding that some objective indicia can be crucial for the
nonobviousness determination.256 These conflicts may come up during
district court infringement cases, patent examination,257 and post-issuance
reviews of patents at the PTAB, the PTO’s judicial arm,258 leading to
inconsistent decision-making throughout the patent system.
B. THE PROBLEMS OF LUMPING AND LINE-DRAWING
This Section examines two other related (and interrelated) problems
with the primary-secondary classification scheme. The first is lumping, which
causes courts to mis-weigh certain kinds of evidence based solely on which silo
the evidence falls into, rather than on an individualized determination of the
particular facts in the record. The second is line-drawing, which has to do with
the difficulties the Federal Circuit has run into in trying to place some types
of obviousness evidence into a specific (i.e., primary versus secondary)
category.259 These issues further contribute to unpredictability and error in
§ 103 decision-making, demonstrate that reliance on the two evidentiary silos
confuses more than clarifies, and confirm that a new approach to evaluating
obviousness evidence is needed.
1. Lumping
Secondary considerations are sometimes treated as a kind of a unitary
lump, without any distinct, targeted analysis of the specific piece or form of
non-prior art evidence that is proffered. For example, the entirety of objective
indicia might be errantly viewed as unconvincing because, say, commercial
success evidence was weak, and thus become devalued by association.260 On
the flip side, facts falling into the primary bucket are sometimes overvalued
thanks to the opposite dynamic—a halo effect based on their primary status.

255. See, e.g., Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also infra notes 276–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Agrizap and Sundance cases).
256. See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Plantronics,
Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354–57 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
257. To be sure, some form of a staged § 103 inquiry might be unavoidable during patent
examination. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (defining “PTAB”).
259. For an illuminating discussion of lumping and line-drawing in another context, see LEE
ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW AND LIFE 212–14 (2019).
260. This type of error is related to the problem discussed in the previous Section, which is
that facts classed as secondary sometimes get a short shrift merely because they happen to fall
into this category, without an independent evaluation of the probative value of the specific piece
of proffered evidence. See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. However, as the next
Section shows, this type of error can also work in favor of the patentee when certain evidence is
categorically overvalued.
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It bears emphasizing that these errors can affect case outcomes. Using
illustrative examples, I consider these problems in turn.
i.

Errors in Favor of Patent Challengers

One way to exemplify the first type of error is with failure of others. PreGraham, lower courts often held that this evidence can be highly probative of
nonobviousness.261 Judge Learned Hand, a strong proponent of inferring
validity from failure of others, explained that “the rationale is that what has
for long escaped the quest of competent experimenters in the field, spurred
on by hope of gain . . . demanded talent out of the common.”262 Even
commentators expressing general suspicion of objective indicia, particularly
Robert Merges, agreed that consideration of failure of others can, in the right
circumstances, lend “analytical rigor . . . to the nonobviousness inquiry” and
strongly support validity.263 Under the cognitive framework, this evidence can
be directly probative of both lack of motivation and reasonable expectation
of success: the former, because a PHOSITA would be discouraged to go down
a path that has proven unfruitful; the latter, because a PHOSITA would not
expect success where other competent researchers have failed.
Graham acknowledged such evidence and even cited a Judge Hand
opinion to highlight its significance.264 But the Court also stated that failure
of others fell into the secondary tier,265 a scarlet letter that can cause judges
who dislike secondary considerations to treat this evidence as automatically
unpersuasive. The conflict is real. Thus, some opinions have held “that failure
by others, including the accused infringer, to develop the claimed invention
constitutes ‘virtually irrefutable’ evidence of nonobviousness.”266 Others,
261. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 862–66 (collecting cases).
262. Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1947). For an example
from another circuit, see Entron, Inc. v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 295 F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1961).
263. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 864.
264. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (citing Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d
501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960)). This analysis in Graham is focused on commercial success, but it is
applicable to other secondary considerations because the Court does not distinguish or single
out commercial success as different from other objective indicia.
265. Id. at 17.
266. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (per curiam)); see In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride
Extended-Release Capsule Pat. Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (calling this “classic
evidence of nonobviousness”); Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
320 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]here can be little better evidence negating an
expectation of success [for purposes of nonobviousness] than actual reports of failure.”). To be
sure, the inference of validity can be defeated, for example, with a showing that the failures were
due to the competitors’ lack of knowledge or appreciation of the available prior art, given the
“omniscience” of the PHOSITA construct. See Robbins, supra note 112, at 1173–74 & nn.26–27;
see also infra notes 425–26 and accompanying text (discussing the nexus issue). But cf. Durie &
Lemley, supra note 3, at 997 (arguing for an approach that would take competitors’ actual
knowledge into account).
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however, have not been as inclined to acknowledge the value of this
evidence.267
In Agrizap v. Woodstream, for example, the Federal Circuit held a patent
on a rat trap operating via electrocution invalid under § 103.268 While prior
art traps relied on mechanical-pressure switches to trigger the electrical
discharge, the claimed invention took advantage of the grisly insight that the
rat itself can function as “a resistive switch” to complete the circuit and
generate a current—a solution conceptually related to the cattle prod.269 The
court determined that this apparatus was too similar to the prior art and
basically ended the inquiry there.270 Thus, it noted that “[t]he only difference
between the [the prior art] and the asserted claims . . . is the type of switch
used to complete the circuit that triggers the generator,”271 and concluded
that other evidence could not “overcome such a strong prima facie case”
against the patent.272
The court treated objective indicia cursorily. It observed only that
“commercial success of the [patented device], copying by [the defendant],
and a long felt need in the market for electronic rat traps” were “insufficient,”
and omitted any mention of failure of others.273 But although the commercial
success-based argument for validity was indeed weak,274 evidence of long-felt
need and failure of others was well-developed and surely had some creditable
probative value. The record, for example, suggested that the defendant was
“encountering great difficulty in filling the unmet need in the marketplace,”
but “gave up on its own design approximately one-year [sic] into
development”275 because it was unable to come up with a workable resistiveswitch design. The court, however, did not separately analyze the various
secondary considerations and did not even address the defendant’s failures at
all. Indeed, it seemed to undervalue all objective indicia (and to ignore some
267. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 3, at 997.
268. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
269. Id. at 1340, 1343–44.
270. Id. at 1344. While the Agrizap court did not analyze motivation and reasonable
expectation of success explicitly, it did rely on KSR’s proposition “that ‘[t]he combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results.’” Id. at 1343 (alteration in original) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007)). Christopher Cotropia, however, argued that Agrizap is in tension
with KSR in that the Federal Circuit zeroed in on the similarity between the invention and the
prior art and essentially sidestepped the motivation inquiry. See generally Cotropia, Predictability,
supra note 179 (critiquing the use of what Cotropia terms “Type II predictability”).
271. Agrizap, 520 F.3d at 1344.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See Principal and Response Brief of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Agrizap, Inc. at 52, Agrizap,
520 F.3d 1337 (Nos. 2007-1415, -1421), 2007 WL 3218900, at *52 (mentioning commercial
success, but failing to fully develop the argument for why it is relevant to validity).
275. Id. at *53–54; see also id. at *26 (discussing the defendant’s “own failure for years to
make the very discovery it now contends was obvious”).
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altogether) based on the “secondary” classification.276 Thus, the silos can lead
to arbitrariness in the § 103 inquiry and, in turn, potentially impact ultimate
validity judgments as a result.277
ii.

Errors in Favor of Patentees or Applicants

The Federal Circuit sometimes makes a mirror-image error. Thus, the
court has occasionally concluded that evidence collectively known as
“unexpected results” weighs heavily in favor of the inventor based in part on
the view that it constitutes a primary consideration in the obviousness
inquiry.278 In so doing, the court has often failed to fully consider what the
proffered piece of evidence tends to show with respect to the elements of
motivation and reasonable expectations of success.
Here, it is helpful to understand why unexpected results are often
contested. While not limited to chemical patents,279 many of the cases
featuring this evidence involve properties of pharmaceuticals or materials
(such as therapeutic utility and shelf stability).280 Such patents tend to be
highly economically significant and often present close validity questions,281
which can turn on this kind of evidence. Harris Pitlick found unexpected
results to be “the most prevalent form of evidence of nonobviousness . . .
during patent examination,”282 and they often come up in litigation too.283

276. Cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 62–71 (providing a separate
analysis of the relevance for each secondary factor).
277. See, e.g., Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (dismissing secondary considerations for failure to “overcome this strong prima facie case
of obviousness”); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (disposing
of all secondary considerations together in a cursory fashion); Cubist Pharms., Inc. v. Hospira,
Inc., 805 F.3d 1112, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (offering a similarly limited analysis of secondary
considerations); cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 52 (criticizing decisions like
Sundance).
278. This evidence is sometimes, though not always, classified as primary, a point to which I
return below. See infra notes 301–02 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion in the
categorization of unexpected results evidence).
279. 3 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9:76 (4th ed. 2020 update) (“[T]he
question of inherent properties is not limited to chemistry. Instead, it extends to structure claims
generally.”).
280. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (offering a chemical example of unexpected results); In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298–99 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (discussing a non-chemical example of unexpected results).
281. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and
the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1159–68 (2019) [hereinafter Karshtedt, The More Things Change].
282. Harris A. Pitlick, Some Thoughts About Unexpected Results Jurisprudence, 86 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 169, 169 (2004). Notably, other secondary considerations, such as
commercial success, appear less frequently during patent prosecution, though they come up a
great deal in litigation. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1004–07 (discussing patentees’
reliance on secondary considerations during litigation).
283. See generally Frederick G. Vogt, Comment, Unexpected Results: The Current Status of
Obviousness Determinations for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Patents, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. &
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In short, the basic rule holds that a finding that a chemical compound’s
properties are better than predicted tends to establish nonobviousness.284
Superficially, this inference seems straightforward based on the idea that, in
chemistry, structure and properties are inextricably linked: Structure dictates
a material’s properties.285 Because hypotheses about effects of a structural
change of a prior art chemical or material on its function are often wrong,
this area of science can be challenging.286 Thus, if a compound exhibits
unexpectedly beneficial properties for the purpose that the invention seeks
to achieve, an inventor can argue that he or she should get the patent for
bucking conventional wisdom,287 which would have instead predicted inferior
or pedestrian outcomes and thus discouraged the pursuit of the invention.288
Some judges assign as great a weight to unexpected results as one would
to other types of validity evidence often characterized as primary, such as
teaching away in the prior art.289 But this move might be unjustified in some
circumstances—specifically, when this evidence is unlikely to speak to the
state of the art at the time of filing.290 Indeed, what if the unexpected property
or function was discovered long after the patent application on the chemical
was filed? Can such evidence validly bear on a PHOSITA’s motivation, and
should the patentee still get credit for it? Marion Western argued that this
cannot be the rule in a student note provocatively titled Is 35 U.S.C. 103
Applicable to Chemical Compounds?:

ENV’T L. 305 (2010) (discussing and criticizing the treatment of unexpected results in the Federal
Circuit’s case law).
284. In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995); cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra
note 54, at 69 (exploring the possibility of having this evidence count in favor of the patentee
regardless of timing considerations).
285. See In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
286. See Michael Willis Vary, Note, Chemical Obviousness and 35 U.S.C. § 103, 31 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 949, 951–52 (1981).
287. See Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 345 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In
a very real sense, it was not . . . merely prior art which taught away from using the [claimed
solution], but rather, common sense. Often common sense is the most potent barrier to
innovation and it takes uncommon ingenuity to disregard it.”).
288. Lemley, supra note 223, at 1388 (“Truly unexpected results may cause us to question
whether the PHOSITA really had a reasonable expectation of success . . . .”).
289. See id. at 1382–85 (collecting cases). To be sure, the Federal Circuit sometimes weighs
unexpected results heavily in favor of nonobviousness even when it codes them as secondary. See,
e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1088–90 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Knoll Pharm.
Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam). But cf.
Eisenberg, Nonobvious Problem, supra note 54, at 418 (“The coding of surprising properties
evidence as ‘secondary’ may have led the Federal Circuit to discount its relevance in [a significant
opinion].”). Finally, and strangely enough, some Federal Circuit panels have characterized
teaching away—which is usually significant in obviousness analysis—as a secondary consideration.
See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
290. See Lemley, supra note 223, at 1388 (“It seems hard to conclude, as some courts have,
that unexpected results that weren’t even known at the time of the patent application indicate a
lack of motivation to try the patented invention.”).
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It seems rather inconsistent to say that a compound is obvious until
an unobvious property is discovered and then say that an invention
was made ab initio since the compound inherently had that property
all the time. Since chemical compounds have myriad uses all one has
to do is continue screening and testing any given compound until
some unobvious property turns up and then predicate patentability
of the compound on the basis of this inherent unobvious property.
Should enough time and testing be devoted to any given chemical
compound some unobvious property could surely be detected, and
hence render said compound patentable.291
Western was correct to question the relevance and probative value of
post-filing unexpected results. In the modern frame of KSR, this evidence may
be dubious because it does not necessarily speak to a PHOSITA’s challenge at
the relevant time.292 For example, “belated” (i.e., post-filing) unexpected
results may reflect the inventors’ diligence in developing a fuller
understanding of the claimed material after filing,293 rather than demonstrate
that a PHOSITA would have had to work against the grain before the date of
the patent application. To be sure, one can envision a patent system that
rewards post-filing research efforts and even developmental work designed to
achieve commercialization.294 Indeed, some scholars have argued that patent
law should do more to facilitate taking products to market.295 Nonetheless,
the extant approach to obviousness focuses on invention rather than
commercialization, which makes it crucial for tribunals to evaluate the
bearing of the proffered evidence on the state of the art at the filing date.
Notably, the Federal Circuit has taken a small step toward a more
nuanced view of unexpected results in a recent opinion, Forest Laboratories v.
Sigmapharm Laboratories.296 In Forest, the court refused to credit a claimed

291. Marion Wayne Western, Is 35 U.S.C. 103 Applicable to Chemical Compounds?, 8 IDEA: PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RSCH. & EDUC. 443, 451 (1964).
292. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
293. See Lemley, supra note 223, at 1388. In future work, I intend to explore an alternative
vision of the nonobviousness requirement that rewards this kind of work by bolstering ex post
evidence. Cf. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949,
1021–24 (2015) (distinguishing early-stage and later-stage innovation).
294. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 697, 748 (2001) (describing legislative efforts influenced by the commercialization view
of patent law); F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 744 (2005) (discussing the importance of patent law rules supporting
commercialization).
295. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 277 (1977); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 361 (2010); cf.
Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at 88 (advocating for an ex post view of § 103).
296. Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
remanding to 473 F. Supp. 3d 376 (D. Del. 2020).
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chemical’s low toxicity in the patentee’s favor.297 It explained that “[w]hile we
have permitted evidence from after the patent is granted to be considered in
assessing whether there are unexpected results, the results must be
‘unexpected by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of [the]
application.’”298 The Federal Circuit then concluded that the trial court erred
in relying on this evidence because “there was nothing in the prior art” to
create a baseline expectation of toxicity that the inventors overcame.299 But as
noted above, other panels have assigned high probative value to unexpected
results and did not inquire into how the timing of their discovery might bear
on a PHOSITA’s cognitive challenge at the time of filing.300 This issue thus
embodies yet another intra-circuit conflict in the treatment of § 103 evidence.
2. Line-Drawing
We have now seen that classification as primary or secondary can impact
how tribunals value a particular fact in a § 103 case significantly—sometimes,
to the point of prejudgment. A great deal, therefore, can hinge on this
antecedent decision, and one would expect that the criteria for making it
would be well worked out. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit is not at all
uniform in how it characterizes certain types of evidence. Unexpected results
constitute one example. As I and other commentators have observed,301 the
Federal Circuit has sent mixed messages on whether such evidence falls into
the primary or secondary bucket.302

297. Id.
298. Id. (second alteration in original) (first citing Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam); and then quoting In re Geisler, 116
F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The court must have meant “after the patent application is
filed” instead of “after the patent is granted.”
299. Id. To be sure, the court probably did not go far enough here, and should have
questioned whether the evidence of low toxicity reflects purely post-filing developments (and
therefore may not be reflective of the state of the art at the time of filing even if a baseline of
expectations were established). See infra notes 456–58 and accompanying text; cf. Velander v.
Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would be wrong to impute later-recognized
insights—or possible obstacles—to the knowledge available to those skilled in the art at the time
of the invention. . . .” (quoting Garner v. Velander, Interference No. 104,242, Paper No. 110, at
*13 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 16, 2001))).
300. Supra note 289 and accompanying text; see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v.
Glenmark Pharms. Inc., 748 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis
Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Takeda Chem. Indus.,
Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1361–63 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
301. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 478–79 (6th ed. 2020); Eisenberg, Nonobvious Problem,
supra note 54, at 418–29; Karshtedt, The More Things Change, supra note 281, at 1159–68; Vogt,
supra note 283, at 309–12.
302. Compare Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 748 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(discussing unexpected results without mentioning “secondary considerations” or “objective
indicia”), and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997–98 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (analyzing unexpected results separately from secondary considerations), with SüdChemie, Inc. v. Multisorb Techs., Inc., 554 F.3d 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff]
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Both positions, to be sure, can be justified. On the one hand, a chemical’s
properties can be viewed as an integral part of “the claimed invention as a
whole,”303 and thus potentially an aspect of “the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art”304 within Graham’s primary inquiry.305 On
the other hand, this evidence may be secondary because an unexpected result
is a true “objective indicium”—a real-world, historical fact purportedly
untainted by an evaluative judgment of how “close” the invention is to the
prior art.306 The conflict persists without any promise of resolution,307
exacerbating the problems discussed above and further illustrating the
difficulties caused by a rigid implementation of the Graham framework.
There are other kinds of evidence that resist the primary-secondary scheme,
such as teaching away and related “demotivating” evidence. Prior art
statements discouraging the path toward the invention—i.e., teaching away—
usually constitute primary evidence, though some opinions have classified it
as secondary.308 But when similar information is embodied in uncodified

contends that secondary considerations, including unexpected results, copying, and commercial
success indicate that the invention . . . would not have been obvious to a person of skill in the
art.”), and Forest Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 501 F.3d 1263, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (calling
unexpected results a “secondary consideration[]”). See also Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, at *47 & n.37 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017) (Bryson,
J., sitting by designation), aff’d per curiam, 742 F. App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (mem.) (suggesting
that there is inconsistency in the Federal Circuit case law on the issue of characterization of
unexpected results and ultimately treating this evidence as primary).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
304. Id.; see also Eisenberg, Nonobvious Problem, supra note 54, at 418 (“Evidence of surprising
or unexpected properties is unlike these other sources of ‘market’ evidence that indicate
obviousness only through a chain of inferences. It is primary, technological evidence going
directly to the statutory inquiry as to ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000))); Note, Standards of Obviousness
and the Patentability of Chemical Compounds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 607, 607–09 (1974) (explaining the
difference between these two views of a chemical’s properties in the context of § 103 analysis).
305. See generally In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing the consideration
of subject matter as a whole as a key concept in the obviousness inquiry).
306. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this evidence can still be
somewhat manipulable. Karshtedt, The More Things Change, supra note 281, at 1152–59.
307. Although, in 2014, several Federal Circuit judges pointed out tensions in the court’s
approaches to unexpected results (and other aspects of nonobviousness analysis) and called for
en banc action to resolve them, the court has not yet done so. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1352–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (mem.) (Taranto, J., joined by
Lourie and Reyna, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
308. See, e.g., Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 836–37 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(considering “teaching away” separately from objective indicia); Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea,
726 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (similar); see also Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra
note 54, at 71–72 (describing teaching away as primary evidence). But see Ecolochem, Inc. v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (addressing teaching away under
secondary considerations); Miles Lab’ys, Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(categorizing teaching away as part of “objective indicia”); see also John Paul Putney, Are Secondary
Considerations Still “Secondary”?: An Examination of Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness Five Years After
KSR, 4 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF, no. 2, 2012, at 43, 48 & n.43 (citing 2-5 DONALD S. CHISUM,
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opinions of industry players, then it is typically viewed as secondary if the
classification is mentioned at all.309 It is odd that this technical evidence is
grouped with economic, market-based evidence such as commercial success,
rather than with teaching away, because the views of scientific experts are
usually more, well, technical than economic. As one Federal Circuit opinion
put it, teaching away and expert skepticism are not different in kind: “In
effect, ‘teaching away’ is a more pointed and probative form of skepticism
expressed in the prior art.”310 But the pull of the Graham silos is strong, and
teaching away and skepticism are in fact typically treated as belonging to
separate evidence categories.
But that is not all. Let us take non-prior art evidence that directs a
PHOSITA to work towards the claimed invention. It would seem that, by
symmetry with non-prior art facts pointing in the opposite direction—e.g.,
skepticism of experts—such evidence should also logically be secondary.311
Nevertheless, as we already learned from KSR, design need and market
pressure pushing the field toward the invention appear to be a part of the
primary inquiry.312 Indeed, the Supreme Court gave these factors a central
role in the motivational calculus while chiding the Federal Circuit for its rigid
prior art-focused TSM test.313 The rationale behind this categorization
difference is difficult to pin down, and the tension between how pro- and antipatent evidence that is not in the prior art is classed suggests that KSR’s
“expansive and flexible approach” may well be inconsistent with a reading of
Graham that mandates rigid evidentiary silos.314 The next Section further
explicates this point.
C. ELIMINATING THE SILOS
Before laying out the scheme for replacing the primary-secondary
framework with a time-based approach to § 103, this Article must address
whether the evidentiary tiers purportedly created by Graham can be validly
eliminated and superseded given the controlling law. This Section entertains
the view that these silos are mandated by statute or Supreme Court precedent

CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05 (Matthew Bender ed., 2012)) (classifying teaching away as a
secondary consideration); Holte & Sichelman, supra note 211, at 157 & n.265 (same).
309. But cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 71–74 (noting the similarity of
skepticism and teaching away in terms of what these types of evidence mean for nonobviousness).
310. Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 885 (Fed. Cir.
1998); see also Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Obviousness
may be defeated if the prior art indicates that the invention would not have worked for its
intended purpose or otherwise teaches away from the invention.”).
311. Meanwhile, near-simultaneous invention by another or others, which suggests a
“teaching toward,” is a secondary consideration that can be probative of obviousness. See, e.g.,
Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
312. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
313. Id. at 418–22.
314. Id. at 415.
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and shows that these arguments can be overcome. Indeed, both the language
of § 103 and the Supreme Court case law, fully considered, actually support
eliminating the silos.
1. Statutory Language
One argument for keeping the tiers is based on the statute. Section 103
specifically calls out prior art disclosures, directing tribunals to ask whether
“the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious,”315 and says
nothing about objective indicia. This explicit mention of prior art would
appear to suggest that the first three Graham factors are more important than
secondary considerations.
In addition, the reference point for obviousness is novelty, codified in
§ 102.316 The anticipation inquiry under this section is generally technical and
rule-like, and invalidity for lack of novelty requires the identity of “limitations”
(i.e., components of the claim that the inventor is attempting to obtain)317
between a single reference and the claimed subject matter.318 This feature of
the statute also appears to imply that non-prior art evidence is potentially less
important or at least different in kind from the other evidence. In a typical
obviousness case, after all, one reference discloses nearly all the elements of
the invention the would-be patentee is trying to claim—and the initial
assessment of the closeness of the lead reference and the claim frames the
§ 103 inquiry.319
The argument for the primacy of the prior art can be pressed further. To
underscore the seeming similarity between § 102 and § 103 in terms of the
central role of the prior art, courts often appear to treat obviousness as
“almost-anticipation.” Opinions refer to “combin[ing] references,”320
“supply[ing] a missing limitation,”321 or “modifying” the prior art to come up
with the invention.322 For example, in Apple, a prior art touchscreen was

315. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
316. Id. § 102.
317. The Supreme Court in KSR uses the term “elements” instead of “limitations.” KSR, 550
U.S. at 415–21. For purposes of this Article, the two terms are synonymous.
318. See, e.g., In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
319. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
320. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
321. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Akamai Techs.,
Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
322. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Whether a rejection
is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments
from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must
be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination
would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.”).
But cf. K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC., 751 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (distinguishing
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“combined” with a graphical toggle switch; in Graham, the “sandwiched”
shank in the lead reference was “modified” into the claimed free-flex
alternative; in Adams, a zinc electrode was “changed” into a magnesium one;
and in Agrizap, a mechanical-switch rat trap was “reworked” to make a trap
with a resistive switch.323 It thus appears that § 103, concerned as it is with a
particular reference and the differences between it and the claim,
contemplates a principally prior art-based inquiry. Some commentators take
this view, maintaining that the first three Graham factors speak directly to the
invention’s “technical superiority” embodied in a non-trivial technical
advance over the prior art,324 while secondary considerations are only
circumstantial evidence of it.325
Nevertheless, this vision of § 103 is not inevitable. Although, as Part IV
explains, the direct-circumstantial distinction has its place in the law of
obviousness, it does not align with the primary-secondary framework. It is true
that, in the initial stages of analyzing validity under § 103, a fact-finder must
make the technical determinations of what a prior art reference discloses and
how the claims differ from that reference.326 But the motivation and
reasonable expectation subtests underlying the ultimate “differences”
question require judgment beyond a mere comparison between the claim’s
limitations and the prior art.327 The differences must be understood in the

scenarios “involv[ing] the lack of evidence of a specific claim limitation” from “combinability of
references where the claim limitations were in evidence”).
323. See supra notes 18–19, 101–02, 145–49 & 268–69 and accompanying text. I use quotes
to indicate that the inventors in all those cases were not actually changing the prior art to come
up with the claimed subject matter.
324. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 875.
325. Rich, supra note 112, at 39.
326. Cf. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1363–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(setting forth similarities and differences between anticipation and nonobviousness).
327. See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (laying out the
complexities of the § 103 inquiry). Cf. Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 324 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“[Defendant] misperceives the patent law in urging that we focus solely on the
‘differences’ between the subject matter of the claims and the prior art, as though those
‘differences’ were the claimed invention. . . . ‘The “difference” may be slight . . . , but it may also
have been the key to success and advancement in the art resulting from the invention.’” (quoting
Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Serv. Parts, Inc.,
532 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J.) (“Even a minor change may produce a
patentable invention, where the result could not have been readily predicted beforehand by one
skilled in the art.”).
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context of “the art to which the claimed invention pertains”328 and the
characteristics of a PHOSITA, both statutory terms.329
This § 103 language supports the value and importance of evidence
beyond the prior art. As KSR makes clear, sources outside “scientific literature”
that reflect “the wide range of needs created by developments in the field of
endeavor”330 are highly probative of the state of the art and can thus inform
the level of patentable advance.331 In sum, while superficially similar, § 102
and § 103 could not be more different: The former is mainly about the
identity between a single prior art reference and the claim, and the latter is
centrally about ex ante risk and the cognitive challenge of inventing with a
piece of prior art as the starting point.332 Although the steps of analyzing the
prior art and comparing it to the claims are surely an essential part of the
§ 103 inquiry, critical evidence of what it would take to bridge the gap and
come up with the claim at issue can often be found in varied non-prior art
sources.
2. Supreme Court Case Law
As a second line of attack, one may contend that Graham mandates the
tiers of evidence, and the Federal Circuit is simply not free to adopt the
holistic approach unless Congress, or the Supreme Court itself, chooses to
overturn the primary-secondary scheme. Graham’s decision to use the word
“secondary,” the argument may proceed, suggests that non-prior art evidence
is less important or should be considered only after the “primary” evidence
has been evaluated.333 The proponent of this argument may also point to two
of the § 103 cases that the Court decided between Graham and KSR, which
made the statement that secondary considerations “without invention will not
make patentability.”334 This characterization plausibly indicates that such

328. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018); see In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see
also id. at 1359 (explaining that the inquiry into whether “a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known
options’ from a ‘finite number of identified, predictable solutions’” is in line with KSR (quoting
KSR, 550 U.S. at 421)).
329. See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Level of Skill and Long-Felt Need: Notes on a Forgotten Future,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 579 (2008) [hereinafter Miller, Forgotten Future] (showing how longfelt need evidence can help construct a PHOSITA).
330. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419, 424; see also Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047,
1058–59 (4th Cir. 1976) (highlighting the importance of a PHOSITA’s perspective).
331. Sarah A. Geers, Comment, Common Sense and the Fact Finder Without Skill in the Art: The
Role of Objective Evidence in Achieving Proper Technology Specificity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 254
(2010); Miller, Forgotten Future, supra note 329, at 583.
332. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 2, at 643 (illustrating differences between these two
patentability requirements using the doctrine of analogous art).
333. Lunney & Johnson, supra note 112, at 64; Rhodes, supra note 153, at 1061–62.
334. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (quoting
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950)); see also
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 278 (1976) (adopting a similar approach).
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evidence is best viewed as merely an afterthought or even a kind of a tiebreaker to be used mainly in close cases.
Of course, if one accepts all these implications of Graham, but
nonetheless believes in the soundness of the cognitive framework and agrees
that secondary considerations should be an integral part of the § 103 inquiry,
one can turn to Congress or the Supreme Court to overrule Graham. For
example, Jonathan Darrow argued that secondary considerations should be
codified in a new § 103A to ensure that they are considered fully and
properly.335 The question here, though, is whether there is wiggle room under
extant binding precedent for lower courts to adopt a holistic approach.336
Given the history of the invention requirement, the antecedent of
nonobviousness,337 there is more than just wiggle room. Pre-1952 Supreme
Court case law, though not always consistent on how much value it accorded
to non-technical or non-prior art facts,338 did not speak of categories of
evidence. For example, Loom Co. v. Higgins,339 a nineteenth-century Supreme
Court opinion known for its early articulation of the problem of hindsight
bias,340 noted the importance of long-felt need and failure of others in the
obviousness calculus: “[I]t is plain from the evidence, and from the very fact
that it was not sooner adopted and used, that it did not, for years, occur in
this light to even the most skilful [sic] persons.”341 To a similar effect is the
previously discussed case of Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite, which blurred
the line between the silos by addressing what today might be called long-felt
need and teaching away in the same breath.342 Graham did not hold that
Congress rejected these opinions—rather, its principal conclusion was that
§ 103 largely codified the invention precedents—and the Court itself
decidedly did not treat the primary-secondary distinction as a break from
prior case law.343
Moreover, to the extent Graham offered a framework, it has been
modified by Adams and KSR. As earlier discussion suggests, Adams implicitly
pushed back on Graham by ignoring the Court’s own primary-secondary
heuristic and giving equal time to the discouragement coming both from the
prior art and from the skepticism of experts.344 While Graham and Adams had
335. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 92.
336. But cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to
Combine: A Presumption-Based Approach, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPS. (Mar. 30, 2007)
(manuscript at 5–9) (offering a defense of the use of presumptions in § 103 cases), https://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=976695 [https://perma.cc/JPV4-UAP2]
337. See supra Section II.A.
338. Sirilla, supra note 76, at 463–69.
339. Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591–92 (1881).
340. Sirilla, supra note 76, at 464–65.
341. Loom Co., 105 U.S. at 591.
342. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 495 (1876).
343. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
344. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1966); see supra Section II.B.3.
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the same author, Justice Tom Clark, he apparently felt no need to analyze the
patent in Adams pursuant to the scheme that he had just set up in the Graham
opinion. And although KSR rightly treated Graham as the foundational
modern case on obviousness,345 the KSR Court notably relied on Adams when
it provided substantive guidance for analyzing § 103 in the form of the
“reason-to-combine” subtest.346
Indeed, KSR built principally on Adams (and on lower-court case law),
rather than on Graham, when it ruled that there is more to § 103 than adding
up elements from disparate prior art references.347 The Court relied on Adams
for the proposition that “a patent composed of several elements is not proved
obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently,
known in the prior art”348 and then highlighted Adams’s critical facts: the
consensus in the field that the invention could not be achieved and the result
that it worked well against all expectations.349 KSR, to be sure, cited two of the
Court’s other post-Graham § 103 cases downplaying objective indicia, but not
for that proposition. Instead, the Court characterized those opinions as
“elaborat[ing] on [Adams’s] approach” that, without evidence of unexpected
results, close similarity between the patent and the prior art may signal lack of
“risk[].”350
Given KSR’s heavy reliance on Adams, perhaps we should be talking about
“the Adams-KSR framework” in addition to or even instead of “the Graham
factors.” Moreover, it is worth underlining once again KSR’s (and Adams’s)
insight that in the context of the cognitive framework, evidence outside of
prior art matters as much as disclosures in the references do. Just as it makes
little sense to minimize or ignore motivational evidence that does not come
from a specific reference,351 non-prior art demotivational evidence should,
under KSR, logically be on equal footing with analogous pro-patent prior artbased evidence, such as teaching away.352
* * *

345. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007).
346. Id. at 416, 418.
347. Id. at 418 (citing In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961)).
348. Id.; see also id. at 418–19 (“[I]nventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building
blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of
what, in some sense, is already known.”).
349. Id. at 418.
350. Id. at 416–17 (first citing Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.
57 (1969); and then citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)).
351. Cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 54 (“The Supreme Court more
recently increased the relevance of secondary considerations in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc. . . . .”).
352. Cf. Durie & Lemley, supra note 3, at 991–92 (arguing that nonobviousness standards
should be more sensitive to what real scientists having limited information before them would
think and do when faced with the problem addressed by the claimed invention).
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The totality of the Supreme Court’s invention and nonobviousness
precedent, therefore, does not mandate rigid evidentiary silos, and neither
does the language of § 103. The holistic judges have it right, and the Federal
Circuit should abandon the formal primary-secondary distinction that several
judges on that court currently adhere to with great stringency. The Article
now turns to Part IV, which shows why the proposed ex ante/ex post framework
belongs in its place and lays out the procedural steps that the court can take
to eliminate the old framework and ensconce the new one into law.
IV. TOWARD A TIME-BASED OBVIOUSNESS FRAMEWORK
One possible next step after the elimination of the primary-secondary
framework is simply to consider all nonobviousness evidence as it comes in,
without any categorization—a completely holistic approach. This Part
explains, however, that this treatment of the § 103 inquiry would be a mistake
because the evidence termed here “ex ante” differs from its “ex post”
counterpart in a salient way. As a result, that distinction would be useful to
introduce as an aid to reasoned § 103 analysis. If the statutory command to
determine obviousness “before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention”353 is to be implemented rigorously, then a new way of classifying
the evidence is needed. Accordingly, the proposed scheme offers a
comprehensive evidentiary framework for structuring the obviousness inquiry
around the critical dimension of time.
The organizing principle underlying the ex ante/ex post classification
parallels the general distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence
in the context of how a particular fact relates to the time of filing within the
obviousness inquiry.354 Because it appears in the art independently of the
patented invention and generally before the date of the patent application,
ex ante evidence bears in a temporally direct way on the cognitive challenge
facing a PHOSITA in a § 103 case. In contrast, ex post evidence concerns
societal value of the invention after it has “matured” in the process of further,
post-filing development or commercialization. Thus, the bearing of ex post
evidence on the pre-filing state of the art is temporally indirect in the sense
that its relevance depends on a showing that the invention’s demonstrated
value actually corresponds to a non-trivial ex ante difficulty of coming up with
that invention.
The analogy between the proposed ex ante/ex post categorization and
the direct/indirect evidence distinction has its limits. Obviousness is not a
fact, but a legal judgment, and a PHOSITA is not a real person, but a
construct. One cannot directly observe motivation the way that a witness

353. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
354. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 241, 247–55 (2006) (distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence).
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watches an accident, nor does one infer reasonable expectation of success in
the sense that a fact-finder can infer distracted driving from the absence of
skid marks.355 Still, the analogy helps pave the way to a more disciplined
analysis by reminding parties and decision-makers of the need to link the
evidence to the state of the world before filing.
This Part develops a time-based scheme for evaluating obviousness. First,
it lays out in greater detail the theories of relevance for both pre- and postfiling evidence within the cognitive framework. Second, it explains how
specific extant types of obviousness evidence should be realigned after the
primary-secondary framework is abandoned, and how their relevance and
weight would be established under this Article’s timing proposal. Third, it
illustrates the framework in action and shows how the Federal Circuit can
adopt the proposal as a practical matter.
A. RELEVANCE THEORIES FOR OBVIOUSNESS EVIDENCE
The filing date of a patent application is a critical benchmark for
ascertaining claim validity.356 Under the current version of the Patent Act,357
one generally compares the date of the reference with the filing date to decide
if it constitutes prior art.358 To be sure, tribunals must sometimes decide, for
example, at what point a reference became sufficiently accessible to the public
to qualify as a “printed publication” within the meaning of § 102, an inquiry

355. “Obviousness is [ultimately] a question of law based on underlying factual findings,”
including the subsidiary Graham factors and the inferences of motivation and reasonable
expectation of success (or lack thereof). Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d
1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). For a critique of treating motivation as factual, see generally Joshua
L. Sohn, Re-Thinking the “Motivation-to-Combine” in Patent Law, 48 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2020).
356. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(i) (defining “effective filing date”); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of a “priority” date).
357. Under the law prior to the AIA, when the U.S. patent system was under the so-called
“first-to-invent” regime, inventors could avoid prior art by “antedating” the potentially
invalidating reference by proving an earlier invention date. See MPEP § 2150 (9th ed. Rev.
10.2019, June 2020) (comparing the relevant dates in pre- versus post-AIA obviousness analyses).
Now, with some exceptions, any proper reference dated earlier than the filing date qualifies as
prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (setting forth those exceptions). Although patents subject to the
pre-AIA regime are still being litigated, the old rules are becoming increasingly less significant
with the passage of time. See generally Michael F. Martin, The End of the First-To-Invent Rule: A Concise
History of Its Origin, 49 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 435 (2009) (discussing the transition from
first-to-invent to first-to-file). Still, while the anchoring date has changed from invention to filing,
the cases involving pre-AIA patents (like Graham and KSR) remain relevant to post-AIA § 103
because of their substantive analyses.
358. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (stating that a reference qualifies as prior art and may defeat
novelty if it was dated “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”). An exception
to this rule involves a scenario in which the inventor “publicly disclosed” the patented subject
matter before the date of the reference and one year or less before the effective filing date. See
id. § 102(b)(1)(B).
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that can turn complicated.359 But once the date is set, all one usually has to do
is look at the calendar.
Prior art that qualifies under § 102 generally also counts as prior art for
§ 103 purposes.360 But the filing date also matters for obviousness in another,
though related, way. Because § 103 asks if “the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention,”361 obviousness must be measured in view of the state of the
invention’s field as of that date. The filing date, therefore, also frames the
motivation-expectation inquiry.
The “at the time of filing” question under § 103, however, is much more
challenging than for § 102 because the former requires much more mental
gymnastics and judgment.362 Because a determination of whether a claim
would have been obvious must always be conducted after the filing date
—sometimes long after—as a practical matter, tribunals must rely on prior art
disclosures, expert opinions in and out of court,363 and other evidence to help
them evaluate the claimed invention in the context of the state of the art at
the proper time. This is a trebly difficult exercise because it calls for a highly
technical inquiry from the perspective of a hypothetically constructed
individual at some point in the past.364 But all three components are essential
to an accurate § 103 analysis.
359. See, e.g., GoPro, Inc. v. Contour IP Holding LLC, 908 F.3d 690, 693–96 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
360. The references, to be sure, must be from the “field of the invention” or be “pertinent to
the problem” solved by the patent under the analogous art doctrine. See Sci. Plastic Prods., Inc.
v. Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Michal Shur-Ofry, Connect the Dots:
Patents and Interdisciplinarity, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 89 (2017) (discussing circumstances
under which connecting different technical disciplines requires special insight). See generally
Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1091 (highlighting the importance of
properly applying the analogous arts doctrine for accurate obviousness determinations).
361. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
362. The timing inquiry for § 103, moreover, is also not black-and-white in the way that the
§ 102 inquiry is: It may matter, for example, if a need for an invention existed for a long period
of time or a short one. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1599 (explaining that the
goal of § 103 is “to cover only those inventions that, but for the inducement of a patent, would
not have be[en] disclosed or devised for a substantial period of time”); see also Chiang, supra note
9, at 69 (discussing the potential relevance of how long it would take other inventors to come up
with the patented solution in the § 103 analysis).
363. Although it has been argued that skepticism and professional approval may be forms of
hearsay, see EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS 882 (rev. 4th ed. 1991), such evidence is routinely accepted in § 103 cases. See, e.g.,
Asetek Danmark A/S v. CMI USA, Inc., No. 13-cv-00457-JST, 2014 WL 12644295, at *1–2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 2014) (concluding that such evidence is non-hearsay because it is offered not for
the truth of the matter asserted, but rather simply to establish that the statements of praise were
made). But cf. Order at 5–7, Sonos, Inc. v. D&M Holdings Inc., Civil Action No. 14-1330-WCB
(D. Del. Dec. 8, 2017), ECF No. 504 (Bryson, J., sitting by designation) (qualifying the
admissibility of this evidence), https://delawareiplawblog.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/03bddsonos-14-1330-mils.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4U5-P3KR].
364. See Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 971 (2007); Janice M. Mueller,
Chemicals, Combinations, and “Common Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision is Changing
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There is another tricky distinction between prior art and other kinds of
obviousness evidence. Although the date of a reference must, by definition,
precede filing, this does not have to be true for other evidence of the prefiling state of the world for § 103 purposes. For example, in In re Copaxone, the
Federal Circuit properly held that certain clinical trial documents that did not
qualify as prior art were nonetheless admissible to establish invalidity because
they were evidence of “the state of the art.”365 It explained that, though not
publicly available prior to the filing date, these materials could still shed light
“on the motivations of those having ordinary skill in the art at the
[appropriate] time.”366
Like the documents in Copaxone, evidence generated after filing, but
directly indicative of the pre-filing state of the invention’s field, is not unusual.
Indeed, many § 103 cases feature some form of litigation-developed expert
testimony on a PHOSITA’s time-of-filing tacit knowledge and similar
evidence.367 To be sure, such testimony may end up being self-serving or
distorted by hindsight (given that the patent at issue is known to the testifying
experts),368 but it is routinely admissible and directly probative of the prefiling state of the world. Such evidence is allowed because a PHOSITA is
presumed to be omniscient—aware of all the pertinent references and other
relevant pre-filing information that could be probative of motivation and
reasonable expectation of success (or lack thereof), even if it is not widely
available to the public or to the inventor.369
Evidence that paints the picture of the world prior to filing (whenever
generated) can be contrasted with evidence that appears during post-filing
development of the invention or in response to it. Such truly belated, ex post
information commonly includes after-discovered unexpected results and the
market’s reaction to the invention in the form of commercial success of the
patented product.370 Even an omniscient PHOSITA cannot predict the future

Federal Circuit Obviousness Determinations in Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV.
281, 281 (2008); see also Whelan, supra note 154, at 374 (discussing the need to ascertain a
PHOSITA’s “state of mind” at the time of filing).
365. In re Copaxone Consol. Cases, 906 F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
366. Id.; see In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 824 & n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (setting forth circumstances
in which non-prior art documents can directly speak to the pre-filing state of the art); see also Ex
parte Varadhachary, No. 2008-3921, 2009 WL 577039, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 5, 2009) (explaining
that, though published after the filing date of the patent application at issue, a document “is
available to teach the state of the art at the time of [the applicants’] claimed invention”).
367. Eisenberg, Nonobvious Problem, supra note 54, at 402–03.
368. See Mandel, Hindsight Bias, supra note 57, at 1443–44.
369. But cf. Durie & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1015 (suggesting an alternative approach to the
obviousness inquiry that is based on facts that may be realistically knowable to skilled artisans).
370. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1670–71 (discussing unexpected results together
with commercial success).
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and learn what took place after filing, so the first instinct may be to argue that
this kind of evidence is categorically irrelevant to § 103.371
A concurrence in the denial of en banc rehearing in Bristol-Myers Squibb
v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, which two Federal Circuit judges signed onto, took
this view.372 The case dealt with the question of whether a post-filing discovery
that a prior art compound was toxic and thus unsuitable for therapeutic
applications supported nonobviousness of a patent on a structurally similar
(but less toxic) chemical.373 While the controlling panel opinion discounted
this evidence on case-specific grounds,374 the en banc denial concurrence
went further. It maintained that “the pertinent knowledge is that possessed at
the time of the invention” because § 103 “provides that an invention is not
patentable if it ‘would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention.’”375 Thus, the concurrence concluded that the statute and
case law “does not allow consideration” of belated unexpected results
evidence.376
The categorical irrelevance view, however, is incorrect as a matter of logic
and evidence doctrine. As Maggie Wittlin explained, courts properly rely on
what she usefully termed “hindsight evidence” in many areas of law.377
Consider a long-standing problem in contract law—enforceability of
liquidated damages clauses.378 The test for whether such clauses hold up is the
reasonableness of the agreed-upon damages amount as judged at the time of
contract formation, which makes actual damages hindsight evidence.379
Although courts are split on the issue, Wittlin argued persuasively that actual
371. Darrow explored another theory of relevance of commercial success, but it aligns more
with the commercialization theory of patent law mentioned above. See Darrow, Secondary
Considerations, supra note 54, at 86 (“There is an alternate rationale, however, by which
commercial success reflects patentability that does not depend on any inferences. Commercial
success provides direct evidence, not of the state of mind of the inventor, but of the social value
present in the invention.”); see also supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text (mentioning
commercialization and other ex post theories of nonobviousness).
372. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (mem.) (Dyk, J., joined by Wallach, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
373. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
374. Id. at 977–78.
375. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 769 F.3d at 1341 (Dyk, J., joined by Wallach, J., concurring in denial
of rehearing en banc) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103).
376. Id. See generally Douglas L. Rogers, Obvious Confusion Over Properties Discovered After a Patent
Application, 43 AIPLA Q.J. 489 (2015) [hereinafter Rogers, Obvious Confusion] (exploring this
problem in depth).
377. Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2016); see also Lunney
& Johnson, supra note 112, at 49–50, 89–94 (arguing that there is value and relevance to
“hindsight evidence,” including evidence of the inventor’s own path that brought him or her to
the claimed invention). See generally Rachlinski, supra note 167 (discussing safeguards for using
hindsight information in judging).
378. See Wittlin, supra note 377, at 1378–84 (describing areas of law in which hindsight
evidence is used extensively).
379. Id. at 1379–80.
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damages can be probative of ex ante reasonableness and that those
jurisdictions “that universally deem this evidence irrelevant are mistaken.”380
This is because “[a] knowledgeable party has some ability to predict damages
accurately, so reasonable stipulations are more likely to approximate actual
damages than unreasonably low stipulations.”381
Wittlin’s argument is well-founded.382 Relevance is a low bar,383 and actual
damages can usually clear it readily because the purpose of non-punitive (i.e.,
reasonable) liquidated damages clauses is to approximate actual damages.384
However, such evidence is not foolproof in terms of timing: For example, the
damages might be unforeseeably high because of an unexpected spike in the
price of some input for making a product specified in the contract, or other
changes in the market.385 Thus, the relevance of belated or ex post evidence
—here, actual damages—to the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time
of contracting cannot simply be assumed, and other information can
undercut the inferential link to the past. As a result, although such evidence
is not categorically irrelevant, the pertinence of ex post evidence is more
readily defeasible than that of ex ante evidence based on timing
considerations.386
Consistent with these intuitions, courts have already allowed hindsight
evidence (which this Article has been calling “ex post” evidence) with proper
safeguards to inform inquiries in other areas of patent law. For example, in
the context of analyzing enablement and written description under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a), courts have repeatedly concluded that post-filing events and other
after-developed evidence that may reflect further research in the invention’s
field can properly bear on validity387—even though, as with § 103, compliance
with § 112(a) must be formally measured as of the time of filing.388 While
some types of after-arising evidence in § 112(a) cases (e.g., additional data on
experiments conducted before filing) may speak directly to the PHOSITA’s
380. Id. at 1383.
381. Id.; see also id. at 1334 (“When one occurrence tends to lead to another, evidence of the
second occurrence is suggestive of the first.”).
382. Cf. Leo Katz, Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 863,
864 (2003) (“[W]e know that people are prone to an irrational hindsight bias that makes certain
outcomes seem more inevitable ex post than they did ex ante, and might prompt them to judge
the defendant’s actions as negligent in hindsight when they would not do so in advance.”).
383. FED. R. EVID. 401.
384. Wittlin, supra note 377, at 1383.
385. See, e.g., Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 476 (Kan. 1992).
386. Cf. Sinclair Refin. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 697 (1933)
(addressing related issues in the context of patent infringement damages and acknowledging the
relevance of the ex post “book of wisdom” evidence).
387. See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895)
(analyzing post-filing evidence disproving enablement); Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367,
1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting post-filing evidence that potentially shows that the claims
are not adequately described).
388. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1370–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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ability to make and use the invention or to appreciate that it is adequately
described, at least one court recently recognized that even evidence
unquestionably classifiable as ex post can and sometimes should bear on
whether the claims satisfy the enablement and written description
requirements.389 And while courts can be particularly suspicious of post-filing
evidence bolstering validity,390 even that sort of evidence has been allowed in
appropriate circumstances.391 There is thus both logical and precedential
support for not categorically excluding ex post evidence of obviousness too,
so long as its relevance with respect to state of the art at the time of filing can
be established. Again, however, the proponent must connect such ex post
evidence to the time of filing.
B. REALIGNING THE EVIDENCE
1. Ex ante Evidence
Having discussed general theories of relevance for the ex ante and ex
post categories, this Article now considers how specific types of evidence
should be properly classified in the context of the proposed framework. It is
submitted that the scheme outlined below will lead to more rigorous analysis
of obviousness evidence and thus improve the quality and accuracy of § 103
patentability determinations. The tables below summarize the current state of
the world under Graham’s primary-secondary heuristic (Table 1),392 and then
outline the proposed realignment (Table 2). The key moves are indicated in
italics in Table 2.

389. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 1:17-cv-01734-RGA, 1:18-cv-00536RGA, 2019 WL 1082067, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 7, 2019). See generally Janet Freilich, The Replicability
Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 431 (2020) (calling for more extensive utilization of post-filing
evidence to determine if patent claims are enabled and adequately described); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Patent Disclosures and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459 (2016) (similar); Sean B. Seymore,
Patenting Around Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1139 (2018) (similar); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s
Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845 (2017) (similar).
390. See, e.g., In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1213–14 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (discussing the “new
matter” problem); see also Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(“We agree that post-priority knowledge . . . cannot support the jury verdict of enablement.”).
391. As one court explained, post-filing data “does not render an insufficient disclosure
enabling, but instead goes to prove that the disclosure was in fact enabling when filed.” In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (considering post-filing evidence relating to validity under § 112).
392. Question marks next to “unexpected results” reflect inconsistent classification of this
evidence. See supra notes 301–07 and accompanying text.
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Table 1. Graham’s Primary-Secondary Framework
Primary Evidence

Secondary Evidence

Content of the prior art and the
differences between it and the claimed
invention

Commercial success

Prior art teachings “away” or “toward”
from the claimed invention

Failure of others

Comparison of the properties of the
claimed invention with those of the
prior art, including unexpected
results (?)

Long-felt need

Expert skepticism
Copying of the claimed invention,
licensing, and other forms of industry
acquiescence
Industry praise (or disbelief)
Simultaneous invention
Unexpected results (?)
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Table 2. Proposed Time-Based Scheme

Ex ante evidence
(relating to state of the art facing a
PHOSITA at time of filing)

Ex post evidence
(in reaction to or during further
development of the invention)

Content of the prior art and the
differences between it and the claimed
invention

Commercial success

Prior art teachings “away” or “toward”
from the claimed invention, as well as
market pressures and design needs

Copying of the claimed invention,
licensing, and other forms of industry
acquiescence

Comparison of the properties of the
prior art with those of the claimed
invention, including unexpected results,
if discovered before filing

Comparison of the properties of the
prior art with those of the claimed
invention, including unexpected results,
if discovered after filing

Failure of others

Industry praise (or disbelief)

Long-felt need
Expert skepticism
Simultaneous invention

In this frame, ex ante evidence speaks directly to the state of the art at
the relevant time and the level of challenge a PHOSITA would have faced in
coming up with the claimed invention. As an initial matter, this type of
evidence concerns much of the subject matter that now falls into the first
three Graham factors.393 Thus, it includes Graham’s primary evidence, such as
prior art disclosures and the differences between them and the claimed
invention, with the important caveat that only the differences that have been
ascertained prior to filing count as ex ante evidence.394
More specifically, this information encompasses comparisons between
the lead prior art reference and the claims to see which limitation is “missing”
and the content of any secondary references or other sources that would
supply that limitation.395 This analysis concerns both structural and functional
similarities or differences—think a working battery compared to prior art

393. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
394. See generally Rogers, Obvious Confusion, supra note 376 (making the distinction between
pre- and post-filing unexpected results).
395. See supra notes 320–23 and accompanying text.
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batteries that explode, or drugs that heal compared to those that are toxic.
Similarities or dissimilarities between the prior art and the claimed invention
are relevant to both motivation and reasonable expectation of success—and
the closer the similarity, the more likely the claim is to be obvious.
This setup effectively subsumes pre-filing unexpected results. While, as
discussed above, courts struggle mightily with this evidence,396 the proposed
approach gets rid of the unhelpful tiers and focuses on what matters: time. If
a result was demonstrated and disclosed by the time of filing, then it can
directly support the case for validity.397 The easy case for relevance arises when
the result is actually a part of the patent claim at issue, as is sometimes the
case with recited therapeutic properties of pharmaceutical methods or
compositions.398 In this scenario, the claim itself fairly embodies “the
differences” between the prior art and the claimed invention within the
meaning of § 103. If the result is unclaimed but at least disclosed in the
patent’s specification,399 however, it is still competent time-of-filing evidence
suggestive of unpredictability in the path to the claimed invention.400
Other § 103 evidence in the ex ante category includes statements in the
prior art indicating whether the path toward the invention would be expected

396. Supra Section III.B.1.ii; see MOY, supra note 279, § 9:76 (addressing some challenges with
this evidence).
397. Cf. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“To show obviousness, it
was necessary to determine from knowledge already available in the art at the time of [the]
invention that one skilled in the medicinal chemical art would have expected [the claimed
compound] to be useful in the treatment of depression in humans.”).
398. See, e.g., Sanofi v. Watson Lab’ys Inc., 875 F.3d 636, 647–50 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
399. Or knowable to a PHOSITA given the information available in the patent’s specification
in view of the state of knowledge in the art at the time of filing. See In re Khelghatian, 364 F.2d
870, 875–76 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (analyzing the problem of inherent disclosures). But cf. Robert A.
Choate, Invention and Unobviousness—“Afterthoughts”—Reliance on Features and Advantages
Undisclosed at Original Filing, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 619, 619–20 (1967) (discussing the problem
of unexpected results that are not apparent from reading the patent’s specification).
400. See Lemley, supra note 223, at 1388 (maintaining that unexpected results are “evidence
that hints that an invention was not well understood until it was made”). A difficult question arises
when the unexpected result, even if ascertained by the time of filing, eventuates through
complete serendipity. Is it probative of a PHOSITA’s cognitive challenge, or does crediting such
evidence in the inventor’s favor constitute windfall for pure luck? In the frame of this Article,
recognition of a serendipitous result before the time of filing might itself be evidence that the
inventor has overcome a complex problem in the field, making it reasonable to conclude that
the result should favor patentability. Cf. Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185, 192,
194–95 (2009) (arguing that “to associate an unexpected finding with irrationality is improper”
and noting that “unknown properties of compounds can only be uncovered through actual
experimentation”). But cf. Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (D.N.J.
2006) (“The fact that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill would have been surprised to learn
that the particular combination of elements created an unexpected benefit completely unrelated
to the desired outcome does not logically imply that it would not have been obvious to combine
those elements to achieve the desired result.”); MOY, supra note 279, § 9:77 (expressing doubt
that this evidence should favor the patentee). I thank Kevin Collins for suggesting that I make
this point.
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to bear fruit and other disclosures encouraging or dissuading a PHOSITA to
work towards the invention. The latter could, for example, include technical
information suggesting that the invention was a matter of routine
optimization, as in KSR, or, to the contrary, that it would have been expected
to be inoperable or at least difficult to develop, as in Adams.401
In addition, in line with KSR, courts have recognized various types of ex
ante evidence falling outside specific prior art references. It includes market
pressures, design needs, as well as the general complexity (or lack thereof) of
the relevant field or the problem being solved, which can be introduced via
expert testimony.402 For example, under the obvious to try doctrine, a patent
challenger could successfully identify a path to the claimed invention based
on the motivation created by the need for a more efficient solution to a known
problem and a reasonable expectation of success due to a small number of
potential research options for solving it.403
Next comes a clear break from the Graham regime. As noted above, prefiling non-prior art evidence types currently falling within the secondary tier
—failure of others, long-felt need, expert skepticism, and simultaneous
invention—can be directly probative of nonobviousness (or, for simultaneous
invention evidence, of obviousness) based on their timing.404 This evidence
matters for the same reasons that prior art evidence and “KSR evidence” of
design need and market pressure does: It is indicative of a PHOSITA’s state
of knowledge at the time of filing.405 The relevance of industry expert views,
which can teach toward or away from the invention just as much as the prior
art itself can, is particularly easy to establish. As we have seen in cases like Broad
Institute, skepticism can be especially probative of the lack of reasonable
expectation of success: Before the invention was made, top scientists in the
field literally suggested that the path toward it would have been difficult and
fraught with technical risk.406

401. See supra notes 198–202 (discussing KSR); supra notes 139–49 and accompanying text
(discussing Adams).
402. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text (discussing KSR).
403. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rogers, Gobbledygook, supra
note 189, at 85.
404. See supra notes 340–42 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of teaching away);
Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 361, 371. To be sure, for failure of others and long-felt need
to count in favor of validity, a nexus to the technical challenge of coming up with the invention must
be established. See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 862–66, 872 (discussing the need to
establish a technical nexus for this evidence).
405. See Whelan, supra note 154, at 360 (discussing the importance of various secondary
considerations evidence in ascertaining a PHOSITA’s “state of mind”); see also Robert W. Harris,
The Emerging Primacy of “Secondary Considerations” as Validity Ammunition: Has the Federal Circuit Gone
Too Far?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 185, 189, 197 (1989) (arguing that some types of
non-prior art evidence should in theory count against the patentee).
406. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291–95 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 885 (Fed. Cir.
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The relevance of failure of others to nonobviousness may be less
straightforward to demonstrate in spite of the temporal directness of this
evidence (in that it concerns pre-filing experience in the field).407 As Merges
explained, in order to have failure of others count in its favor, the patentee
must show that other inventors were actually engaged in a serious pursuit of
the problem eventually solved by the patentee.408 The failure must thus be
due to cognitive or technical challenges presented by the invention,409 and
not because, for example, the failed project was under-resourced due to poor
business judgment or alternative research priorities.410
Evidence of long-felt but unmet need, which Merges viewed as generally
less probative than failure of others, can still be relevant in a direct way to a
PHOSITA’s pre-filing motivation and reasonable expectation of success if the
proponent establishes its connection to the claimed invention’s technical
merit.411 Thus, the inventor may be able to demonstrate that other firms did
not attempt to address the technical challenge solved by the patent because
the art viewed the solution as too difficult to even try pursuing,412 or perhaps
that the patent met the extant need by an insightful reformulation or even
recognition of the problem.413 The entity arguing against patentability could,
however, undermine or defeat the relevance of such evidence by showing, for
example, that the problem went unsolved because of a once-pricy input that
suddenly became less expensive, leading readily to the claimed solution once
the inventing firm used its managerial (rather than technical) acumen to take
advantage of this development.414

1998); Cotropia, Predictability, supra note 179, at 429 (maintaining that some secondary
considerations can serve as evidence of unpredictability).
407. As Merges maintained, such evidence may properly be considered circumstantial from
the technical perspective. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 863. Nevertheless, as this
Article argues, it is direct in the temporal sense.
408. See id.
409. See PAUL H. BLAUSTEIN, LEARNED HAND ON PATENT LAW 106 (1983).
410. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 826–27, 862–66 (discussing the challenges
for establishing nexus for failure of others evidence).
411. Id. at 830.
412. See id. at 830, 872.
413. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 68 (1923) (“The invention
was not the mere use of a high or substantial pitch to remedy a known source of trouble. It was
the discovery of the source not before known and the application of the remedy for which Eibel
was entitled to be rewarded in his patent.”); In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585 (C.C.P.A. 1969);
In re Antonson, 272 F.2d 948, 949 (C.C.P.A. 1959); see also Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9,
at 372 n.117 (discussing Eibel Process and related opinions). See generally Pedraza-Fariña, Innovation
Failures, supra note 133 (noting the critical role of problem recognition for nonobviousness).
414. See Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 352–53; Merges, Commercial Success, supra
note 53, at 857–58; see also Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1484 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (providing an example of an exogenous development that might diminish the value of this
evidence). But cf. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1382–83 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (seemingly ignoring the nexus requirement for commercial success).
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The mirror image of failure of others and of long-felt but unmet need is
simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, invention of the claimed subject matter
by others. This evidence may point toward patent invalidity by tending to
establish that the claims embodied no special technical challenge because
PHOSITAs have already converged on that solution.415 But this type of
evidence, too, has its limitations. Consider, for example, the scenario of two
eventual Nobel laureates coming up with the same invention at about the
same time, which hardly proves that it was readily within a PHOSITA’s grasp.
Here, a clarifying observation is in order. It is possible for evidence such
as simultaneous invention to materialize at some point after the effective filing
date, rather than before it. Indeed, because it is highly unlikely for someone
else to come up with the same subject matter on precisely the same date that
the patentee filed the application, the “simultaneous” invention would in
practice be made shortly before or after filing. No matter on which side of the
filing date this activity falls, however, it is still ex ante evidence tending to show
directly that the patented invention would have been obvious. This is because
the other inventors worked within the same state of the art available to a
PHOSITA as the patentee, which of course did not include the discovery
embodied in the patent at issue. Regardless of the precise point in time that
the simultaneous invention materialized, the competing inventors developed
it not in response to the patent, but independently from it.416
More generally, while the filing date presents a convenient default
dividing line, the specific date when the evidence comes into being relative to
that date is not determinative of its ex ante or ex post status—what matters
mainly is its independence from the invention. This can be true for
simultaneous invention, documentary evidence that does not qualify as prior
art in cases like In re Copaxone,417 testimony prepared for litigation, and even
failure of others. Thus, even if the failure is fully confirmed after filing,418 such
evidence is still actually ex ante, because it continues to mainly reflect prefiling challenges and risks facing the field without the knowledge of the

415. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
416. Cf. Chiang, supra note 9, at 69 (suggesting that the incentive of a patent may not be
necessary in a patent-race scenario). The Federal Circuit missed this point in Hybritech, 802 F.2d
at 1380 n.4 (holding that evidence that “the invention was contemporaneously developed and
disclosed in at least five publications and patent applications . . . and dated well after the filing date
of the . . . patent but before its issuance is irrelevant . . . because obviousness must be determined as
of the time the invention was made”). The error is all the more notable because the court
elsewhere in the opinion enthusiastically embraced the post-filing evidence of commercial
success. Id. at 1382–83.
417. See supra notes 365–66 and accompanying text.
418. Because patent applications typically publish 18 months after the effective filing date at
the earliest, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2018), a competitor may not know that someone else has
come up with a solution to the problem at issue and could thus keep working on it (rather than
abandon the project after losing the race).
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invention at issue.419 If anything, if the failure of others materialized postfiling,420 such evidence would be more probative of validity relative to a prefiling failure because the problem the patent ended up solving has continued
to be challenging even as more knowledge presumably accumulated in the
world.
2. Ex post Evidence
In this Section, I enumerate the various kinds of ex post obviousness
evidence and address the burdens of demonstrating its relevance for the § 103
inquiry.421 With the exception of the odd case of unexpected results, which
have been characterized inconsistently,422 ex post evidence comprises the
objective indicia that are responsive to the invention.423 Ex post evidence
potentially relevant to obviousness runs the gamut from largely economic
—namely, commercial success—to largely technical—namely, afterdiscovered properties of the claimed subject matter.424 Further, the secondary
considerations of professional approval, acquiescence through licensing, and
copying of the patent have both technical and non-technical characteristics.
But whatever its technical provenance, the proponent of ex post evidence
must do some work to connect it to the cognitive and technical challenges
facing a PHOSITA at the time of filing in order for it to count.425 The
proponent, in short, must show that ex post evidence has a nexus to the time
of filing. While courts currently rely on the nexus construct mainly to
determine if the proffered objective indicia relate to the technical merit of
the claimed invention,426 this Article extends it to timing considerations.
Let us take these one at a time, starting with commercial success.427 This
evidence includes data such as high sales volume of a patented product,

419. The key, once again, is independence of the evidence from the invention, with the
effective filing date serving as a default diving line between ex ante and ex post evidence.
420. Cf. Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 371.
421. Cf. Whelan, supra note 154, at 374–75.
422. See supra notes 301–07 and accompanying text.
423. It possible for some of this responsive evidence (e.g., commercial success or praise for
an invention on which a patent application has not yet been filed) to materialize prior to the
filing date, but it is still ex post in the scheme of this proposal. Cf. supra notes 367–69 and
accompanying text (discussing the flip-side scenario of ex ante evidence that is generated after
filing).
424. Cf. Whelan, supra note 154, at 377–80 (questioning the relevance of this evidence).
425. Cf. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1604–12 (explaining that, while economic
considerations can come into play under the current approach to obviousness, the analysis is still
based mainly on cognitive inquiries).
426. See, e.g., ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Richdel, Inc.
v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discounting evidence of commercial
success where the patentee “failed to show that [it] . . . was due to anything disclosed in the patent
in suit which was not readily available in the prior art”).
427. For an alternative approach to commercial success, see Darrow, Secondary Considerations,
supra note 54, at 86 (explaining that this evidence can be probative of obviousness based on its
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profitability of this product, rapid growth in market share attributable to the
embodiments of the claimed invention, and so on.428 Commentators have
long argued that establishing the relevance of commercial success to
nonobviousness requires multiple showings on the part of the patentee.429
The facially plausible theory of relevance is that, if there was easy money to be
made with the invention at issue, then someone would have already come up
with it—and the fact that no one has managed that until the patentee did
tends to establish that things were not so straightforward.430 This evidence is
Wittlin’s hindsight evidence: belated, but still potentially relevant. The theory
of its relevance, however, requires some unpacking.431
As others have noted, commercial success can be rather attenuated from
the ex ante challenge of coming up with the claimed invention.432 As an initial
matter, to support validity, commercial success must be due to the technical
quality of the innovation at issue and should not be attributable to, for
example, a particularly persuasive advertising campaign or a feature of the
product not covered by the patent at issue.433 Moreover, and closer to the
indication of intrinsic social value of the claimed invention rather than on a chain of inferences
with respect to the pre-filing state of the art); and Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1670–72
(similar). But cf. Kitch, New Standards for Patents, supra note 53, at 331–35 (questioning decisions
to count commercial success in favor of validity based on these considerations).
428. See generally Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration
in Patent Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707 (2009) (discussing this evidence).
429. Kitch, New Standards for Patents, supra note 53, at 332–35; Merges, Commercial Success,
supra note 53, at 829–32.
430. DONALD S. CHISUM, TYLER T. OCHOA, SHUBHA GHOSH & MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 77 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW].
431. Notably, the commercial success of the defendant (of other firms) in using the claimed
invention should not be credited in favor of the patentee if those firms did not copy the patent,
because such evidence actually points against an inference of any special difficulty of coming up
with the invention that the patentee has overcome. See Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 373
(“[C]ommercial success by others—parties not licensed by the patentee, and especially those who
have independently created the patented subject matter—tends to provide affirmative evidence of
obviousness.”). See generally Spencer H. Boyer, Commercial Success as Evidence of Patentability, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 573 (1969) (reviewing the rationale behind the doctrine of commercial success
as evidence of patentability and suggesting that it is mainly the patentee’s success that matters). But
cf. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1034–35 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting
a commercial success argument, but not on the grounds that the success did not involve the
plaintiff’s device); see also Reed W.L. Marcy, Note, Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect
of Inconsistent Standards Regarding Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19 HASTINGS
COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 199, 214–15 (1996) (suggesting that commercial success achieved by the
infringement of the patented invention should be in favor of the patentee, but without making clear
whether independent invention would still count).
432. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 854–55. But cf. Holbrook, Possession, supra note
186, at 1032 (“Commercial success . . . suggests that, if the invention was commercially successful,
other inventors would have been highly motivated to create the innovation, and the patentee,
who was the first to get there, is ultimately deserving of the patent.”).
433. See FOX Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Demaco Corp.
v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Merges, Commercial
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central point of this paper, some commentators have maintained that
commercial success can be truly probative of nonobviousness only if linked to
long-felt need or failure of others,434 a connection that would anchor the
evidence in the pre-filing state of the world. This approach essentially deprives
commercial success evidence of independent significance in implying that, by
itself, it cannot speak to the pre-filing challenge facing a PHOSITA.
There are, however, ways in which the requisite link to the time of filing
can be made without subsuming commercial success under other recognized
categories of obviousness evidence. For example, as Abramowicz and Duffy
suggested, the patentee can point to failed attempts to secure venture capital
or similar facts, if available, as evidence showing that the patented product’s
commercial success was a result of a risky research path.435 In addition, the
patentee could try to demonstrate that its competitors have had a track record
of prior accomplishments, and thus would have been unlikely to pass up an
opportunity to make some easy money. Thus, the inventor can build the case
for relevance of commercial success evidence with pre-filing information (and
other kinds of foundation) in order to establish that the success was indicative
of a PHOSITA’s challenge at the time of filing.
While commercial success represents the market’s reaction, professional
approval and industry praise generally capture the ex post take of competitors
and other technical experts.436 Unlike ex ante evidence such as pre-invention
industry skepticism, these indicia may be tainted by post-hoc rationalization
—or even by the necessity of saving face to one’s shareholders and colleagues.
Thus, it is important for the patentee to demonstrate that this evidence should
bear, even if indirectly, on a PHOSITA’s pre-filing fund of knowledge.437
Here, temporal debiasing may be successful if the patentee shows that
participants in the industry at issue are fierce competitors who are generally
not effusive about the successes of others unless the research in question
embodies a true advance that overcame serious cognitive and technical

Success, supra note 53, at 826–27; Edward Philip Walker, Objective Evidence of Nonobviousness: The
Elusive Nexus Requirement (Part I), 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 175, 176 (1987).
434. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 830; see also Geers, supra note 331, at 254 &
n.129 (arguing that ex post evidence is merely “corollary and corroborative of the failure of others
in the field”).
435. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1676 (“The evidence of unexpected commercial
success that may thus be most relevant is evidence about the difficulty of obtaining funding for a
research project. . . . At times, relatively objective evidence of this, such as rejections from venture
capitalists or memoranda indicating considerable skepticism within an organization about a
particular approach, may be available, and such evidence could even be made available to patent
examiners.”).
436. Demaco Corp., 851 F.2d at 1391 (“The rationale for giving weight to the so-called
‘secondary considerations’ is that they provide objective evidence of how the patented device is
viewed in the marketplace, by those directly interested in the product.”).
437. Institut Pasteur v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

This preprint research paper has
Electronic
not been
copy
peer
available
reviewed.
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820851

A1_KARSHTEDT (DO NOT DELETE)

1674

5/23/2021 2:31 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1609

barriers.438 Indeed, this theory of relevance of ex post praise is related to the
exception to the rule against admissibility of hearsay for statements against
interest.439 Because competitor praise may help the patentee under current
obviousness law, it may well be unlikely to be distorted by hindsight and thus
trustworthy.440 In addition, in many cases, the relevance might be more readily
established if the praise or approval materializes immediately after the
invention is publicized rather than some time after it has become
entrenched.441 If the positive reaction is only slightly belated,442 it may be
more likely to bear on the pre-filing state of affairs rather than reflect
“contamination” by post-filing information.443
Licensing of the patent, copying of the patented invention, and other
forms of industry acquiescence are closely related to praise.444 Some
commentators believe that this evidence is generally weak because it may be
cheaper to tolerate a patent that one actually thinks is invalid than to
challenge it.445 But each case turns on its own facts, and the patentee may be
able to develop an evidentiary foundation that supports the relevance and
probative value of acquiescence. Thus, discovery may reveal that competitors

438. See Edward Philip Walker, Objective Evidence of Nonobviousness: The Elusive Nexus Requirement
(Part II), 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 229, 236–40, 245–46 (1987) (discussing “acclaim” and
“admissions” of nonobviousness); see also WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“Industry participants, especially competitors, are not likely to praise an obvious advance
over the known art.”).
439. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
440. Cf. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Com. Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068,
1072 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he litigation argument that an innovation is really quite ordinary
carries diminished weight when offered by those who had tried and failed to solve the same
problem, and then promptly adopted the solution that they are now denigrating.”).
441. See Duffy, Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 364 (explaining how the timing gap between
the obviousness evidence and the filing date can help establish or disprove obviousness).
442. Notably, if the approving statements take the form of “this would have been difficult at
the time of filing,” rather than merely “this is a great invention,” they should be characterized as
ex ante evidence. This kind of praise is analogous to the situation in which the defendant’s
experts, after having analyzed the claims at issue, opine on the pre-filing state of the art. The
evidence is created with the knowledge of the invention, but it is still ex ante. Cf. Institut Pasteur,
738 F.3d at 1346–47 (discussing the evidence of praise, but without parsing which of these forms
it specifically took).
443. However, to the extent that ex post praise of the invention reflects a general consensus
that it reflects a major achievement that has stood the test of time, such ex post evidence might still
be quite probative of patentability. See infra notes 449–51 and accompanying text.
444. See, e.g., Liqwd, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 941 F.3d 1133, 1137–39 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
445. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 439 (5th ed. 2020) [hereinafter
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS] (making this point); see also Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports,
Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting licensing evidence); Cable Elec. Prods.,
Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1027–28 (Fed. Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by
Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (expressing
skepticism of copying evidence); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 928–30 (2007) (identifying a bootstrapping effect that may occur
when such evidence is accepted too readily).
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licensed or even copied the patent because they viewed the claims to be
directed to a genuine technical achievement (with the usual caveats about
post-filing hindsight “contamination” of such ex post evidence),446 rather than
because they thought the claims were bad, but expensive to invalidate.
From there, similar to praise, one may then make a further inference that
a PHOSITA could have reasonably viewed the invention as non-trivial ex ante,
making imitation the sincerest form of flattery, or even capitulation to the
patentee’s success, in the case’s particular circumstances.447 Indeed, if the
invention truly revolutionized the field and became an industry standard, the
fact that it presented a pre-filing technical challenge can be reasonably
inferred without any need for additional foundation.448 Still, if the cognitive
framework is to be faithfully implemented, tribunals must keep in mind that
such evidence is only good for what it shows about the pre-filing state of the
world, and refrain from relying on it to bolster patentability as a reward for
the invention’s eventual success and value to society.
What about ex post unexpected results? The critical difference from ex
ante unexpected results has to do with the way they signal motivation and
reasonable expectation of success. While properties ascertained before filing
are “part of the inventive concept” indicative of the difficulties in understanding
the invention at the time of filing,449 ex post unexpected results evidence is
more similar to commercial success. As noted above,450 one general relevance
theory for ex post evidence is “the lure of easy money”: In the words of an
intellectual property treatise, its relevance “is inferential in the sense that the
prior art’s failure to reveal the claimed invention despite its advantageous
qualities tends to confirm that it was unexpected and unobvious,” as “[i]t
would be contrary to normal economic incentives for obvious, advantageous

446. See supra notes 442–43 and accompanying text.
447. See, e.g., Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Copying may indeed be another form of flattering praise for inventive features.”); see also
Holbrook, Possession, supra note 186, at 1032 (“Copying . . . creates an inference that others were
not in possession of the invention because they had to rely on the patentee to create the device.”).
448. In one opinion, Judge Learned Hand came close to saying that hindsight may in fact be
a part of the reason why ex post evidence is valuable. See Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Courts, made up of laymen as they must be,
are likely either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties in making new and profitable
discoveries in fields with which they cannot be familiar; and, so far as it is available, they had best
appraise the originality involved by the circumstances which preceded, attended and succeeded the
appearance of the invention.” (emphasis added)); cf. supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text
(explaining that one reason that secondary considerations caught on was the belief that lay
people could not handle technical evidence in patent cases). This view, however, may be
somewhat outdated in the age of patent-specialist entities like the Federal Circuit, the PTAB, and
district judges who focused on patent cases under the “patent pilot” program.
449. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 430, at 77; see
also Lemley, supra note 223, at 1388 (explaining that unexpected results show that the field of
the invention was not well understood).
450. See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text.
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subject matter to remain dormant.”451 As with commercial success, however,
the dots to the time of filing must still be fully connected.452
Thus, the propriety of the “easy money” inference can be probed with
certain questions. For example, was there really a pre-filing baseline of
negative expectations that the patentee was up against?453 In addition, could
it be that this belated evidence was a product of the inventor’s diligence in
creating post-filing knowledge, rather than reflective of the fact that the
patentee overcame a significant pre-filing challenge? Related, did the full
appreciation of the invention’s benefits come about thanks to post-filing
growth in the field, or, instead, are the benefits actually indicative of gaps in
understanding that were present at the time of filing?454 These questions may
not be easy to answer, but they must be addressed in order to evaluate the
post-filing unexpected results properly. In all, by keeping straight the notion
that the probative value of ex post unexpected results (and of other types of
ex post evidence) is ultimately to shed light on the state of the world at the
time of filing, courts can ensure that they are performing the proper
relevance analysis. This approach should, in turn, help improve the accuracy
of ultimate § 103 judgments in the context of the cognitive framework.
Moreover, a regime mandating that the relevance of ex post evidence to
the state of the art at the time of filing cannot simply be assumed—as courts
now often allow it to be455—would encourage inventors to develop the
necessary data as early as possible. This approach may help reduce the
disjunction that often manifests itself between § 103 evidence during patent
prosecution as opposed to litigation, after the patentee has devoted additional

451. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 430, at 77; cf.
Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 45, at 870–72 (questioning the evidentiary value
of unexpected results discovered after filing with respect to the issue of motivation in the
nonobviousness inquiry).
452. Cf. Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54, at 72 (discussing the relationship
between unexpected results and skepticism). But cf. id. at 75 n.171 (“[I]n the pharmaceutical
industry, the prior art might not teach away from a particular compound, but the compound’s
combination of beneficial properties could nevertheless constitute unexpected results.” (citing
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Lab’ys, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. W. Va. 2004))). In
this sense, if the prior art taught away from the invention’s properties, they must logically be
unexpected. Cf. C. Dylan Turner, Note, In Cyclobenzaprine, an Objective Failure to Reach a LongFelt Need in Secondary Considerations Jurisprudence, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 359, 372 (2015)
(explaining that “one with skill in the art would not reasonably expect success knowing of the
previous failed attempt” (citing In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Pat.
Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2012))).
453. Cf. Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC, 918 F.3d 928, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
To be sure, even unexpected results revealed before filing might be challengeable on this basis.
See supra note 400 and accompanying text.
454. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 752 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
455. See, e.g., Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1378–39 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also
supra notes 289 & 300 and accompanying text (discussing this dynamic with unexpected results).
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resources to the invention.456 Related, the proposed scheme also takes on the
incongruity of the claim subject matter’s “shift” in patentability as a function
of time thanks to post-filing developments.457 As a result, the timing
framework should promote earlier generation and disclosure of technical
information—which is something that many believe the patent system should
encourage.458
C. THE ULTIMATE § 103 QUESTION AND THE PATH FORWARD
1. Weighing the Evidence
The categorization scheme proposed in this Section is intended to foster
discipline in the process of establishing relevance of various facts proffered to
prove or disprove obviousness. But relevance, of course, is only the first step
in evidence evaluation. Even if the proponent establishes a link between the
evidence and a PHOSITA’s technical and cognitive challenges at the time of
filing, a tribunal must still weigh the various pieces of evidence against one
another to reach a judgment on obviousness. For example, if the patentee
barely overcomes the relevance hurdle for ex post evidence like commercial
success, it may be only weakly probative of motivation and would probably not
stand up against other evidence suggesting that the invention was within a
PHOSITA’s ready grasp.459
Indeed, as with any other legal determination, the various pieces of
obviousness evidence put forth by the parties will often conflict. Thus, there
could be clashing evidence within the ex ante category, as well as across the
two categories.460 One example of the first kind of a clash occurred in the well-

456. See generally Greg Reilly, The Complicated Relationship of Patent Examination and
Invalidation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 1095 (2020) (analyzing the implications of this disjunction to
reform of the examination process); Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, supra note 245 (noting this
disjunction and proposing reforms).
457. Harris, supra note 405, at 199–200 (flagging the oddity of having the patent validity
change as a function of time); Western, supra note 291, at 451 (same).
458. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542–44 (2009); Sean
B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624–27 (2010). One
potential problematic effect of this rule is that patent filing may be delayed, but there are already
many rules encouraging early patenting. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in
Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88 (2009).
459. Lemley, supra note 223, at 1372–73.
460. Clashes within the ex post category do not seem possible because all this evidence favors
the patentee—with the exception, perhaps, of expected results, which can be probative of
obviousness whether ex ante or ex post. See, e.g., In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538 (C.C.P.A.
1967). As some commentators have suggested, this is a strange state of affairs, and perhaps there
should be more recognized forms of ex post evidence against validity (such as commercial
failure). See, e.g., Harris, supra note 405, at 188–89; see also Kitch, New Standards for Patents, supra
note 53, at 333–34 (suggesting that perhaps commercial success should count against the
patentee); cf. 1 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, ROBERT P. MERGES & SHYAMKRISHNA
BALGANESH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020, at 233 (2020)
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known case of Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling v. Maersk Drilling USA, in
which evidence of industry skepticism conflicted with prior art literature
stating that the various “concerns [about pursuing the invention] were
unfounded.”461 Relying on the two-step approach, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the skepticism evidence helped the patentee “rebut a prima
facie case of obviousness”462—based, of course, on the prior art—to reach the
rare result of a nonobviousness judgment supported solely by secondary
considerations.
As discussed above,463 some panels could well have written the skepticism
off once the prima facie case was established, but Transocean did not—which
is what makes the case so unusual that it quickly made its way into
casebooks.464 Under the proposed scheme, instead, the tribunal would weigh
skepticism against the purportedly contrary statements in the literature and
decide whether, given all this evidence, motivation and reasonable
expectation of success have been established. This approach should reduce
the incidence of lumping errors that sometimes take § 103 determinations off
track.465
Likewise, ex ante evidence can clash with ex post evidence. Again in
Transocean, while statements in the prior art supported both motivation and
reasonable expectation of success, ex post evidence told a different story. For
example, the plaintiff cited an “article . . . prais[ing] the development of [its
invention] as one of the fifty key events or technologies in history that shaped
the offshore drilling industry.”466 The court, in the prima facie/rebuttal
mode, explained that this “impressive accolade” tended to show
nonobviousness and thus supported a jury verdict in favor of the patentee.467
In the frame of the proposal, praise sufficiently relates to the time of filing
here because it describes where the invention fits in the field’s trajectory.
Thus, as with skepticism, a jury would be entitled to weigh praise directly

(discussing success of others as a potential flip-side of failure of others that could be probative of
obviousness).
461. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d
1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
462. Id. at 1349, 1355.
463. See supra notes 264–77 and accompanying text.
464. KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT LITIGATION
AND STRATEGY 711–19 (5th ed. 2018); NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, supra note 445, at 428–35;
see also Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1354 (“Few cases present such extensive objective evidence of
nonobviousness, and thus we have rarely held that objective evidence is sufficient to overcome a
prima facie case of obviousness.”).
465. See supra Section III.B.1.
466. Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1351.
467. Id. at 1351, 1359.
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against the prior art-based case for motivation and reasonable expectation of
success.468
More generally, it is up to the decision-maker to consider the evidence
on both sides of the scale and decide which is stronger.469 Any piece of
relevant evidence may be weak and thus vulnerable to being outweighed by a
contrary proffer.470 The case for predictability may be infected with hindsight
bias,471 the need for a solution that the invention provided may have existed
for only a short time,472 commercial success may only be minimal,473 or an
assessment of a compound’s properties could show only a slight improvement
over what would have been expected.474 Clearly, the probative value of any
particular type of evidence can be high or low.475
In sharp contrast with some Federal Circuit panels, however, ex ante
evidence under this Article’s proposal is not divided into tiers that implicitly
suggest higher or lower probative value for particular forms of evidence.
Indeed, the proposal eschews any framework under which evidence could get
automatically discounted or bolstered, and the proposed distinction is mainly
there to police relevance. Although it may be tempting, within the context of
the proposed scheme, to make a rough generalization that the ex post
evidence should carry little weight,476 that sort of a shortcut is not justified.477
468. Or other decision-makers, such as a district judge in a bench trial or a panel of
administrative patent judges at the PTAB.
469. See generally Darrow, Secondary Considerations, supra note 54 (proposing a methodical
approach for evaluating and weighing various objective indicia).
470. See Todd R. Miller, Motivation and Set-Size: In re Bell Provides a Link Between Chemical and
Biochemical Patent Claims, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 89, 92–95 (1993) (discussing the evidenceweighing process in § 103 cases).
471. See generally Mandel, Hindsight Bias, supra note 57 (providing evidence for hindsight bias
in obviousness determinations).
472. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1627–31. Indeed, among other indicia of
persuasiveness, the “distance” of the evidence from the filing date may affect its weight. See Duffy,
Timing Approach, supra note 9, at 363 (“Normally, a pretty strong case of nonobviousness would
be made out where several years passed during which (1) a market need for the relevant
innovation existed and (2) all of the necessary components for the innovation were present in
the prior art.”); Michal Shur-Ofry, IP and the Lens of Complexity, 54 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
55, 67 (2013) (flagging the importance of immediate success in the commercial success inquiry).
In all, the various types of ex ante and ex post evidence proffered in obviousness cases exists on
a continuum of probative value, which is influenced by considerations such as when the particular
piece of evidence came into existence.
473. See, e.g., ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1222–23 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
474. See, e.g., Galderma Lab’ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
475. Cf. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Lab’ys, Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (explaining how another factor, a “blocking” patent, can reduce the probative value of
certain nonobviousness evidence).
476. Cf. Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 53, at 833–34 (distinguishing weight and
relevance of secondary factors).
477. One commentator argues, however, that tools that increase researchers’ facility and ease
of coming up with new inventions will soon essentially overwhelm ex post evidence, and render
everything obvious. See generally Ryan Abbott, Everything Is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2019)
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As in any other area of law—think of errors in direct eyewitness testimony that
may make it less reliable than some indirect or circumstantial evidence, such
as a smoking gun478—ex ante and ex post evidence each has its own
weaknesses and the best a tribunal can do is to stay cognizant of them. These
challenges aside, this Article nonetheless moves the ball by fully articulating
relevance theories for various § 103 evidence based on the key dimension of
time.
One may, to be sure, encounter recurring scenarios in which one kind of
obviousness evidence might usually outweigh another. Mark Lemley, for
example, identified “a number of circumstances in which a simple change
known to those of skill in the art has the predictable, but not deterministic,
possibility of producing different results,” including a pattern of cases
involving the separation of certain types of chemicals.479 Lemley maintained
that, assuming the separation process is straightforward, the inventor should
not be credited for coming up with a product that exhibits surprisingly good
properties—and the claim to that product should generally be held
obvious.480 This analysis provides an example of an established fact pattern in
which the evidence of motivation and reasonable expectation of success based
on the path charted out by the prior art may simply be overwhelming as a
factor against patentability. Nonetheless, as Lemley acknowledged, weak
evidence that the claimed invention would have been obvious to try may be
outweighed by relevant unexpected results, so the analysis must ultimately still
be case-specific.481
2. Implementing the Proposal
If, as argued above,482 this proposal is not foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent, the Federal Circuit can implement it via the en banc process in an
appropriate case. How might such a case come up? As to the first aspect of the
proposal, a disappointed patentee in a case like Agrizap, after seeing its
evidence of failure of others discounted, may petition for en banc
rehearing.483 The questions to be presented to the full court have already
been articulated in Judge Reyna’s dissent in Apple and concern both the
sequence of analysis of the various evidence and the weight to be assigned to
(suggesting that most claims must be obvious under one interpretation of this test); see also Brenda
M. Simon, The Implications of Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 331 (2013) (discussing the interplay of research technologies and § 103 standards).
478. See, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (summarizing why direct evidence may be
so unreliable that expert testimony should be required to provide support for it); Heller, supra
note 354, at 252–53.
479. Lemley, supra note 223, at 1377.
480. Id. at 1377–79.
481. Id. at 1369–70.
482. See supra Section III.C.2.
483. See supra notes 268–76 and accompanying text.
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secondary versus primary considerations.484 The Federal Circuit should
answer them by holding that the primary-secondary distinction is not material,
and should not dictate the sequence of analysis or control the weighing of the
evidence.485
What about the second aspect of the proposal? One way the question can
be preserved is through an evidentiary challenge. For example, a proffer of
commercial success could be contested by a defendant under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 via a motion in limine if there is an argument that it is not
relevant to the state of the art at the time of filing. Here, again, en banc action
is needed because numerous Federal Circuit panels have endorsed the use of
ex post evidence without a clear tie to the filing date.486 While both issues are
unlikely to be raised in the same litigation, the court could grant rehearing
petitions on them in two separate appropriate cases and consider them
together. This consolidation would be useful because the two issues are
related and, indeed, interdependent. The en banc court, notably, would not
have to start from scratch for this aspect of the proposal either. Thus, the
recent Forest opinion adverted to importance of timing for the relevance of
unexpected results,487 and Judge Taranto’s important dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc in Bristol-Myers Squibb laid out a number of tensions in the
court’s post-filing evidence jurisprudence that could eventually be addressed
and resolved by the by the full Federal Circuit.488
If the proposals are adopted by the Federal Circuit, trial courts could aid
juries in heeding this approach to § 103 by providing appropriate instructions
based on the new framework. The PTO, too, could create procedures to
facilitate proper consideration of various obviousness evidence in both
prosecution and in PTAB trials.489 Appellate courts have created the

484. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Reyna, J., dissenting).
485. To be clear, some features of the staged approach may need to be retained at the PTO
based on timing and burdens of production during prosecution. See In re Cyclobenzaprine
Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Pat. Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1080 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
see also supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing special problems faced by the PTO
when evaluating obviousness).
486. See, e.g., supra notes 425–26 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. To be sure, the Forest court still treated
unexpected results as a secondary consideration. Forest Lab’ys, LLC v. Sigmapharm Lab’ys, LLC,
918 F.3d 928, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
752 F.3d 967, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (similar).
488. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1352–59 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (mem.) (Taranto, J., joined by Lourie and Reyna, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
489. Even at the PTO, where the realities of patent prosecution may force the use of the
prima facie/rebuttal framework, it is still possible to consider all the evidence without relying
heavily on primary and secondary silos. See In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976);
cf. supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing information-forcing problems during
examination).
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nonobviousness requirement, and they can take ownership of it once again
with corrective measures that could resolve conflicts over the handling of the
evidence to create a uniform, and more appropriate, framework for
evaluating patentability under § 103 in the lower tribunals.490
V. CONCLUSION
The law of nonobviousness is ever evolving, from courts’ early attempts
to define the contours of the invention requirement to the Federal Circuit’s
recent efforts to structure the § 103 inquiry after KSR. Since Graham was
decided in 1966, the primary-secondary framework has been an important
part of the obviousness inquiry, but it has diverted the courts’ attention to the
wrong questions. Rather than continue with disagreements over whether a
holistic or two-step inquiry is appropriate, the Federal Circuit should scrap
the silo-based approach and focus on the timing of the proffered evidence as
the first step in determining whether the invention was challenging enough
to be patentable as of the time of filing, which is what § 103 requires.

490. While a pessimistic response might be that tribunals develop a gut feeling for what is
obvious (or not) and bring the proffered evidence into line with their bottom-line conclusions,
courts have the responsibility to assure that fact finders are at least properly instructed on the
analytical framework.
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